Unconscious Imagery in Aphantasia: Understanding The Scientific Debate

Have you ever described a cherished memory in vivid detail, even though you can't "see" it in your mind? It raises a fascinating question: could our brains be processing images we just can't consciously access?
aphantasia and unconscious imagery, unconscious imagery in aphantasia
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Have you ever found yourself describing your childhood home in detail despite not being able to “see” it in your mind? Or recognizing a friend’s face instantly, yet unable to conjure their image when they’re not around?

This “knowing without seeing” phenomenon is something many of us aphants experience daily. It sparks a real mind-bending question: what if our brains are actually creating images… we just can’t consciously access them?

Recent research has sparked quite a debate on this very question about whether this might be explained by unconscious imagery in aphantasia. Let’s dive into what scientists are discovering and what it might mean for understanding our image-free minds.

The Research Findings: Could We Consider Aphantasia As Unconscious Imagery?

In the paper “Imageless imagery in aphantasia revealed by early visual cortex decoding,” researchers Chang, Zhang, Cao, Pearson, and Meng published findings that quickly caught attention, with Science Magazine highlighting the research under the headline “People who can’t picture images in their mind’s eye still represent them in their brains.” 

Using brain imaging, the researchers found that when aphantasics attempt to imagine something:

  • Our early visual cortex shows consistent patterns of activity.
  • These patterns contain specific information about what they’re trying to imagine.
  • The brain activity is reliable enough to be “decoded” by computers.
  • However, these patterns are fundamentally different from how the brain processes visual perception.

This might explain something aphants have always found difficult to put into words – that strange sensation of working with visual information without actually seeing it. I’ve read hundreds of emails from our community describing this exact phenomenon. As one member put it:

“When I think about friends and family I’m not just conjuring up a random thought about them. I can describe that picture but still don’t see anything in my mind’s eye. I’ve always found it hard to describe this process because it’s not just words but it’s also not imagery even though it’s based on recalling imagery.”

Another aphantasic captured this paradox perfectly: 

“I remember seeing things but I don’t actually see things. I ‘feel see’—kind of like when you close your eyes and put your hands out in front of you. I don’t see my hands but I can still bring my pointer fingers together to touch.”

These findings raise an intriguing question: Could what we experience as “knowing without seeing” actually be a form of unconscious imagery in aphantasia? The research suggests our brains are processing visual information in organized, predictable ways—just through different neural patterns than those used in typical visual perception or conscious mental imagery.

Scientific Perspectives: Challenging the Unconscious Imagery Theory

The debate over these findings has revealed distinctly different interpretations within the aphantasia research community. While Chang, Zhang, Cao, Pearson, and Meng’s research suggests the possibility of unconscious imagery, two significant challenges to this interpretation have emerged.

First, a January 2025 study by Purkart and colleagues used behavioral measures rather than brain imaging. Their research reached an opposing conclusion, suggesting that “aphantasia relies on a genuine inability to generate mental images rather than on a deficit in accessing these images consciously.

Second, in a critical analysis titled “Against Unconscious Mental Imagery in Aphantasia,” researchers Scholz, Monzel, and Liu argue that merely detecting and decoding brain activity isn’t sufficient evidence for unconscious imagery. Their critique centers on several key points:

  • True imagery (whether conscious or unconscious) should share patterns with how we process real visual information.
  • In non-aphantasics, imagery and perception create similar brain patterns.
  • In aphantasics, these patterns are distinctly different.
  • The brain activity might represent alternative strategies rather than unconscious imagery.

To strengthen their argument, they draw a parallel to blindness research: while blind people’s visual cortex shows activity during various cognitive tasks, we wouldn’t interpret this as “unconscious vision.” This comparison suggests the activity in the visual cortex of an aphantasia brain might instead represent alternative processing strategies.

What This Means for our Aphantasia Community

The Language Matters

I’ve been fascinated by the conversation happening in our community about these findings. As one member pointed out, “How you ask questions and how you make measurements affect the conclusions you draw.” This is crucial – the studies reached different conclusions partly because they used fundamentally different methods. One looked at brain activity patterns, while the other analyzed behavioral responses to visual tasks.

The terminology debate is equally important. One community member’s note really resonated with me:

“I’m ok with the phrase ‘imageless imagery.’ I’m less comfortable with the phrase ‘unconscious imagery,’ because I think I am quite conscious of how things would look if I saw them (but I don’t see them).” 

This perspective highlights how crucial precise language and definitions are when discussing these experiences that impact the lives of so many people.

Understanding Our Experiences

These findings help validate what many aphantasics have long described. Our brains are indeed processing visual information, just differently from how others do it. The debate isn’t about whether we’re processing this information (we clearly are), but about how to best understand and describe this process both scientifically and personally.

Practical Implications And Future Directions

This research suggests that aphantasics might be using alternative cognitive strategies rather than “hidden” imagery. This could explain why we:

  • Can navigate familiar spaces without visualizing them,
  • Remember visual details without seeing them in our minds,
  • Recognize faces without being able to picture them (for about 60% of us),
  • Perform creative and spatial tasks using different approaches.

I find this liberating. It suggests we’ve developed alternative strategies that work perfectly well without mental pictures. This perspective shifts aphantasia from a deficit to a different cognitive style. Rather than focusing on what we “can’t” do, we can explore how our unique way of processing information shapes our experiences and potentially offers advantages.

This could help us:

  • Develop better strategies for tasks typically approached through visualization,
  • Understand and explain our experiences to others,
  • Appreciate the unique ways our brains handle information.

I’ve always believed that understanding aphantasia helps us understand the bigger picture of human consciousness and cognition. This research is one more piece of that fascinating puzzle.

Questions for Future Research

Several important questions remain:

  1. What exactly is our brain doing during imagery attempts if not creating perception-like patterns?
  2. How do these different processing patterns develop?
  3. Could understanding these alternative strategies help develop better tools and techniques for aphantasics?

Conclusion

Whether we call it “unconscious imagery,” “imageless imagery,” or “alternative processing,” one thing is clear: our aphantasic brains handle visual information in unique and reliable ways. We’re not broken or lacking something – we’re simply doing things differently. 

This understanding shifts the conversation from what we “can’t” do to exploring and leveraging our unique cognitive strengths. For too long, aphantasia has been defined by absence.

What do you think about this research? Do you recognize this “knowing without seeing” experience in your own life? Drop a comment below to share your thoughts, or if you’re curious to explore these ideas more deeply with others who get it, our member community is where the real conversations happen.

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Total Comments (4)

Thank you for this article. I feel better about my aphantasia. The idea “imageless imagery” states my experience exactly. l’m so grateful to know that others describe their experience this way, too.

Thank you for this: “This understanding shifts the conversation from what we “can’t” do to exploring and leveraging our unique cognitive strengths. For too long, aphantasia has been defined by absence.” These words are so consoling. I’ve felt this sense of loss for years.

Imageless imagery struck a nerve, as I woke up early this morning and imageless images(experiences) kept ‘popping’ into my consciousness. They were old events that I had mostly forgotten but I ‘felt’ these situations again. One example was when I was maybe 5-6 years old my parents, sister and I took a family trip to Montauk Point on Long Island. While playing in the sand, I found a $2 dollar bill under a piece of drift wood. It felt like I was there again but as much as I tried to visulaize it, I couldn’t and yet I sort of experienced it again. I had multiple other imageless ‘experiences’ from my past this morning. It was exciting as I had thought many of these past experiences were unavailable to me and that I had SDAM. I am excited about exploring if this will help me retrieve more memories from the past.

Cool. I think we can focus and both abilities and inabilities. Do you know if there are any studies about congential vs acquired aphantasia, about how they are different in the brain. I’m also interested in aphantasia and autism. Plus, aphantasia and alexithymia. Also, I would like to know if I’m globally aphantasic or not. I spoke to this network online, sounded like I did have it. However, Prof Joel said that it sounded like I was not globally aphantasia, because I can half remember emoitions from memories, and I can half hear my own voice in my head, speaking all the time. Would be cool if you also did studies on aphantsia and driving ability, and aphantasia and public speaking ability. I’m horrendous at those. I can’t do mental math either, so I can’t give back change like a cashier. But, I passed Math in school. I saw that 30 something peope with aphantasia have depression. I would love to see more research on that. I am also excited about each section of global aphantasia that you made new definitions for because I don’t have the ability to do any of those.

I don’t get the point. An imageless image is not an image. It’s a contradiction. An unconscious image is not an image. It is not accessible to consciousness. Freud’s unconscious is in the same boat. It’s a supposed something that is never really revealed, and thinking that what I am telling you is a revelation of something so far unconscious is not speaking about anything. It’s making things up as a plausible way of understanding yourself. Seeing without visualising is the same. We become accustomed to navigating spaces. I know where to turn in order to get to where I am going, but it is pointless to think of this as seeing without visualising, or even as an alternate strategy. I can take different trajectories through Halifax (Nova Scotia) and go down dozens of different streets and turnings in order to get where I going, and I can even tell you which different paths through the city you can take in order to get to a specific place, naming most of the streets as I proceed, because I have been driving in the city since 1960. But I don’t visualise any of it. Why even suppose that this is an alternate strategy. My daughter can’t find her way around as well as I can though she visualises vividly, and spent years in or around the city for her education, but that’s probably because she didn’t own a car for much of that time, and did not have the routine experience of driving around the city, getting lost and then trying again to find out where you’re going. I simply find most of the theorising that is done about aphantasia unhelpful in understanding what aphantasia is all about. I recognise that I am an aphant, and that I visualise nothing at all, and couldn’t tell you what my wife looked like without a picture to be able to point and say: That’s what she looked like! But how to describe the mental background of all that seems to me like a waste of time, since like psychoanalysis it is all simply trying to account for something to which theory has no access. It’s all after the fact. Visualising doesn’t really help you find your way around. It’s finding your way around that does it, whether you visualise or not. And as for the unique strengths possessed by aphants, that seems like a dream to me, for we use the same tool set that non-aphants use, only our tool set is simply smaller.

Perhaps that’s what you’re trying to say, as your conclusion intimates, but why speak of imageless imagery or unconscious imagery or alternative processing at all. The first two are really contradictions, and alternate processing is not necessary. Aphants are not devoid of strategies, because even people who visualise use the same strategies to do the same things that aphants can do. It’s not an alternate strategy. Aphants are simply missing one dimension of something that could perhaps be done more effectively if aphants had the whole tool set that those whose cognition is normal possess. So I get really frustrated when I read some of the theories of aphantasia that seem to suggest that there are all sorts of arcane mental gymnastics that aphants do in order to understand the world. I don’t think that’s true. Aphants are like plumbers who only have a vice grip instead of a pipe wrench. We’re lacking half of the tool set, that’s all, and must do our best with the tools we have. But those tools, so far as I can discern, are not different to the tools that non-aphants use.