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Aphantasie-Forschung

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Die Bibliothek der Aphantasie-Forschung entwickelt sich weiter. Entdecken Sie die Wissenschaft hinter extremer Fantasie, Aphantasie und Hyperphantasie. Teilen Sie das neueste Wissen.

Aphantasia within the framework of neurodivergence: Some preliminary data and the curse of the confidence gap
Monzel, M., Dance, C., Azañón, E., & Simner, J. (2023). Aphantasia within the framework of neurodivergence: Some preliminary data and the curse of the confidence gap. Consciousness and Cognition, 115, 103567. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2023.103567
The term "neurodiversity" refers to the varied ways people think, learn, and behave, emphasizing that there's no single "correct" way and that differences shouldn't be seen as deficits. This concept often encompasses conditions like Autism, ADHD, and Dyslexia, which diverge from societal norms but can also bring unique strengths. The paper discusses aphantasia, a condition where individuals can't voluntarily visualize images. While they know what things look like, they can't form a mental picture. Despite being a minority, with 3.9% of the population affected, its prevalence is significant. There's debate on whether aphantasia is a disorder or just a neutral form of neurodivergence. This paper argues against viewing aphantasia as a disorder, emphasizing the broader context of neurodiversity.
Aphantasia: a philosophical approach
Lorenzatti, J. J. (2023). Aphantasia: a philosophical approach. Philosophical Psychology, 1–29. doi:10.1080/09515089.2023.2253854
Aphantasia has gained media attention in recent years but remains under-discussed in the philosophy of mind. This paper evaluates potential explanations for aphantasia based on cognitive science research. Four hypotheses are considered: (i) a conceptual discrepancy, (ii) a failure in attention mechanisms affecting introspection, (iii) a lack of conscious access to underlying imagistic representations, and (iv) a complete absence of these underlying representations. The study concludes that the first two hypotheses can be dismissed, while the latter two are plausible explanations. Among them, the fourth hypothesis aligns best with existing evidence. The paper also suggests areas for future research to deepen our understanding of aphantasia.
Imagery in a pair of aphantasic and non-aphantasic identical twins: Neural similarities and differences
Prasad, D., Megla, E., & Bainbridge, W. A. (2023). Imagery in a pair of aphantasic and non-aphantasic identical twins: Neural similarities and differences. Journal of Vision, 23(9), 5800. doi:10.1167/jov.23.9.5800
To delve deeper into the brain activity associated with aphantasia, researchers used fMRI to study identical twins, where one had normal visual imagery and the other had aphantasia. Both twins underwent visual imagery tasks and resting state scans. Findings revealed that while both twins showed similar brain activity shifts during visual recall, their memory representations differed. Notably, even the twin with aphantasia retrieved some visual information during imagery tasks, indicating that despite their inability to visualize, some visual information is still processed in the brain. This study highlights that while experiences of imagery differ between aphantasics and typical imagers, both retain some level of visual information during recall.
The behavioral performance and cortical structural properties of aphantasia
Chang, S., Wang, J., & Meng, M. (2023). The behavioral performance and cortical structural properties of aphantasia. Journal of Vision, 23(9), 5985. doi:10.1167/jov.23.9.5985
This study explored the abilities of people with aphantasia to imagine both static and moving visuals and how they handle visual memory tasks. While they couldn't imagine static images, they experienced motion aftereffects similar to those without the condition. In memory tests, aphantasics performed similarly to controls but relied more on semantic (meaning-based) strategies, unaffected by external light changes, unlike controls. Additionally, MRI scans revealed that those with aphantasia had smaller brain regions linked to executive functions and attention. This research offers new insights into the behaviors and brain structures of individuals with aphantasia.
Reliable and predictive non-perceptual representations in primary visual cortex during attempts at visual imagery in aphantasia
Zhang, X., Chang, S., Pearson, J., & Meng, M. (2023). Reliable and predictive non-perceptual representations in primary visual cortex during attempts at visual imagery in aphantasia. Journal of Vision, 23(9), 5060. doi:10.1167/jov.23.9.5060
In this study using fMRI, researchers examined how the brains of people with aphantasia respond when trying to imagine visual stimuli. Both aphantasic individuals and controls were asked to imagine specific visual patterns. The study found that while both groups showed brain activity in early visual areas during this task, the patterns for those with aphantasia did not match the patterns seen when they actually viewed the stimuli. In simpler terms, while people with aphantasia do have brain activity when trying to visualize, their brain's representation of that imagery is different from when they see things in reality.
Insights into embodied cognition and mental imagery from aphantasia
Muraki, E. J., Speed, L. J., & Pexman, P. M. (2023). Insights into embodied cognition and mental imagery from aphantasia. Nature Reviews Psychology. doi:10.1038/s44159-023-00221-9
Mental representations are the mind's way of understanding and communicating countless concepts. One of the big questions in cognitive psychology is how our brain stores and retrieves the meanings of these concepts. Some theories, known as embodied theories, suggest that when we think of a concept, our brain "simulates" or recreates sensory and physical experiences related to that concept. For instance, thinking of an apple might briefly make us imagine its taste, texture, and color. However, there's debate about how these simulations work or even if they're essential. A way to explore this is by studying mental imagery, which is our ability to create pictures in our mind. Some people, due to a condition called aphantasia, can't form these mental images. By understanding this condition, we can gain insights into how our mind uses imagery and simulations. This paper reviews the idea that our cognition is "embodied" and delves into research on mental imagery. It also discusses the emerging studies on aphantasia and how it can help us understand the broader theories of how our mind represents concepts.
“Diversity makes the richness of humanity”: the emergence of mental imagery after self-reported psilocybin mushrooms intake in an autistic woman with “blind imagination” (aphantasia): a 1-year retrospective case report
Rebecchi, K. (2023). “Diversity makes the richness of humanity”: the emergence of mental imagery after self-reported psilocybin mushrooms intake in an autistic woman with “blind imagination” (aphantasia): a 1-year retrospective case report. doi:10.31234/osf.io/c9fpj
This study delves into the effects of psilocybin mushrooms on a woman with autism and aphantasia, a condition where one can't visualize mental images. The 34-year-old had lived with aphantasia since her younger years. However, after consuming these mushrooms, she astonishingly began to experience clear mental images, a phenomenon she'd never encountered before. What's even more intriguing is that this newfound ability remained even after the immediate effects of the mushrooms wore off. When she later took a test to measure the clarity of her mental images, her scores showed a notable improvement. This discovery supports earlier research about how psilocybin can influence brain functions and visual processing.
Imageless imagery in aphantasia: decoding non-sensory imagery in aphantasia
Meng, M., Chang, S., Zhang, X., & Pearson, J. (2023). Imageless imagery in aphantasia: decoding non-sensory imagery in aphantasia. doi:10.21203/rs.3.rs-3162223/v1
The research delves into the workings of the early visual cortex, a part of the brain associated with visual experiences, including the ability to visualize images in our minds. A unique group of individuals, known as those with "aphantasia," cannot form mental images at all. The study aimed to understand what happens in the brains of these individuals when they attempt to visualize. Using advanced brain imaging techniques, the researchers observed the activity in the primary visual cortex during attempts at mental imagery. In people without aphantasia, this part of the brain showed patterns that matched their visual experiences. However, for those with aphantasia, the brain activity was different and couldn't be matched with typical visual perceptions. Additionally, when these individuals were exposed to visual stimuli, their brain responses were weaker compared to those without aphantasia. In essence, the study found that even though people with aphantasia can't visualize, there's still some form of representation in their visual cortex. However, this representation might be less detailed or different from the usual sensory information. This discovery challenges the traditional belief that activity in the primary visual cortex always corresponds to typical visual experiences.
Feedback signals in visual cortex during episodic and schematic memory retrieval and their potential implications for aphantasia
Bergmann, J., & Ortiz-Tudela, J. (2023). Feedback signals in visual cortex during episodic and schematic memory retrieval and their potential implications for aphantasia. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 152, 105335. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2023.105335
This scientific paper is about memory and vision. The researchers explain how your brain processes memories and what you see. The two main types of memory are episodic memory, which is the memory of specific events in a place and time, and schematic memory, which is your brain's general knowledge about the world. The scientists found that when it comes to visual processing, or how your brain understands what your eyes see, these two types of memory work a bit differently. Episodic memory can affect the earliest stages of visual processing, while schematic memory only influences intermediate levels. They also discuss the idea that different areas of your brain might be involved in retrieving these two types of memories. Episodic memories are processed in both the regions of the brain that deal with recognizing objects ('what' areas) and understanding their location in space ('where' areas). In contrast, schematic memories are mainly processed in the 'where' areas of the brain. Lastly, the paper talks about a condition called aphantasia, where people can't create pictures in their heads or visualize things. People with aphantasia have problems with their episodic memory, but their schematic memory is not as affected. The researchers think this isn't because their episodic memory is faulty, but because these individuals can't process detailed visual information about objects from memory. This could offer new ways to understand and study aphantasia.
Aphantasia, Unsymbolized Thinking and Conscious Thought
Krempel, R. (2023). Aphantasia, unsymbolized thinking and conscious thought. Erkenntnis. doi:10.1007/s10670-023-00706-2
This paper challenges the prevailing belief that conscious thoughts necessarily involve mental images or quasi-perceptual experiences, even when considering abstract concepts. It argues that unsymbolized thinking (thoughts without imagery) and total aphantasia (inability to produce mental images) cast doubt on this view. The author rejects the counterargument that individuals experiencing unsymbolized thinking or aphantasia are mistaken or lack conscious thoughts. Instead, they propose that unsymbolized thinking and aphantasia offer evidence that conscious thoughts can occur without relying on any form of mental imagery, questioning the long-standing assumption about the inseparable connection between conscious thoughts and mental images.
The role of visual imagery in face recognition and the construction of facial composites. Evidence from Aphantasia
Dance, C. J., Hole, G., & Simner, J. (2023). The role of visual imagery in face recognition and the construction of facial composites. Evidence from Aphantasia. Cortex; a Journal Devoted to the Study of the Nervous System and Behavior. doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2023.06.015
In this research, researchers investigated how aphantasia affects the ability to recognize faces. They found that individuals with aphantasia have weaker face recognition abilities compared to those who can visualize images. However, both groups could create facial composite images from memory with similar accuracy. Aphantasics had trouble matching these composites to real faces, indicating issues with face perception. Interestingly, different methods of creating composites, whether holistic or featural, online or in-person, yielded equally accurate results. Overall, the study suggests that the ability to visualize images in the mind plays a crucial role in face recognition and matching. These findings have implications for understanding aphantasia and can be relevant in forensic settings where face composite systems are commonly used in criminal investigations.
Assessing aphantasia prevalence and the relation of self-reported imagery abilities and memory task performance
Beran, M. J., James, B. T., French, K., Haseltine, E. L., & Kleider-Offutt, H. M. (2023). Assessing aphantasia prevalence and the relation of self-reported imagery abilities and memory task performance. Consciousness and Cognition, 113, 103548. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2023.103548
Aphantasia was studied in a sample of 5,010 adults from the general population in the United States. The self-reported prevalence of aphantasia was found to be 8.9%. However, when assessed through visual imagery scales, the prevalence dropped to 1.5%, indicating that not all self-reported aphantasic individuals exhibited low visual imagery. Those who identified as aphantasic reported lower dream frequencies and self-talk, as well as poorer memory performance compared to those with average or high mental imagery. Interestingly, individuals with aphantasia showed a preference for written instruction over video instruction for learning a new task. The study suggests that using both scale measures and self-identification may offer a more consistent understanding of individuals lacking visual imagery.
Measuring imagery strength in schizophrenia: no evidence of enhanced mental imagery priming
Wagner, S., & Monzel, M. (2023). Measuring imagery strength in schizophrenia: no evidence of enhanced mental imagery priming. Brain and Behavior, e3146. doi:10.1002/brb3.3146
This study aimed to explore the relationship between visual imagery, schizophrenia, and the occurrence of hallucinations. The researchers compared a group of 16 individuals with schizophrenia to a group of 44 individuals without the condition. They used questionnaires and a visual imagery task to measure the vividness of visual imagery, and the Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale to assess the occurrence of hallucinations.The results revealed that participants with schizophrenia reported more hallucinatory experiences compared to those without schizophrenia. However, surprisingly, there were no significant differences between the two groups in terms of the vividness of visual imagery as measured by both the questionnaire and the visual imagery task. Interestingly, a positive correlation was found between the vividness of visual imagery measured by the questionnaire and the visual imagery task. This indicates that the measurement tools used were reliable in assessing visual imagery. These findings suggest that the association between mental imagery vividness and schizophrenia may be more complex than previously thought. While individuals with schizophrenia experience more hallucinations, their visual imagery vividness does not appear to be enhanced. This suggests that other aspects of mental imagery may be more relevant in understanding the relationship between mental imagery and schizophrenia.
No increased prevalence of prosopagnosia in aphantasia: Visual recognition deficits are small and not restricted to faces
Monzel, M., Vetterlein, A., Hogeterp, S. A., & Reuter, M. (2023). No increased prevalence of prosopagnosia in aphantasia: Visual recognition deficits are small and not restricted to faces. Perception, 3010066231180712. doi:10.1177/03010066231180712
Aphantasia and prosopagnosia are rare conditions that affect visual cognition. Prosopagnosia involves difficulty recognizing faces, while aphantasics lack mental imagery. Previous theories suggest a connection between aphantasia and prosopagnosia, but recent research shows that aphantasics have impairments in general visual recognition, not just face recognition. In a study comparing aphantasics and controls, both groups performed worse on face and object recognition tasks, indicating mild recognition deficits. The study also found a correlation between imagery vividness and performance, suggesting that visual imagery influences recognition abilities. The complexity of stimuli had a moderating effect, but only for the whole imagery spectrum and with face stimuli. These findings suggest that aphantasia is associated with a general, albeit mild, deficit in visual recognition.
Vividness as the similarity between generated imagery and an internal model
Riley, S. N., & Davies, J. (2023). Vividness as the similarity between generated imagery and an internal model. Brain and Cognition, 169(105988), 105988. doi:10.1016/j.bandc.2023.105988
This research explores the concept of vividness in visual mental imagery (VMI) and its relation to an internal model. While the representational format and neural mechanisms of VMI have been extensively studied, the role of vividness has received comparatively less attention. The paper reframes vividness as the proximity of generated imagery to an internal model and considers its implications in understanding the role of the visual cortex in VMI. Although existing research suggests that early visual areas encode low-level visual features, correlational and causal evidence also indicates that their involvement in VMI may not be explicit. The conflicting results could be reconciled by a deeper investigation of vividness. The study proposes using self-reports, such as the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire, to measure vividness in VMI. The study may have implications for understanding aphantasia, a lack of mental imagery experiences.
Subjective signal strength distinguishes reality from imagination
Dijkstra, N., & Fleming, S. M. (2023). Subjective signal strength distinguishes reality from imagination. Nature Communications, 14(1), 1627. doi:10.1038/s41467-023-37322-1
This research explores how our brain distinguishes between real and imagined experiences. The study shows that the line between reality and imagination is blurred, with imagined and perceived signals get mixed together. The researchers used a combination of psychophysics, computational modeling, and neuroimaging to investigate this phenomenon. They found that judgments of reality are based on whether the mixed signal, which includes both imagined and perceived elements, is strong enough to cross a reality threshold. Interestingly, when the virtual or imagined signals are strong enough, they become subjectively indistinguishable from reality. The study also suggests that the frontal cortex, responsible for emotions and memories, may play a role in regulating the strength of the mental image signal. Further research is needed to understand the factors that determine the vividness of mental imagery and the distinction between the imagery signal and the reality threshold. In future studies, it would be intriguing to investigate the reality thresholds of individuals with hyperphantasia, an extremely vivid imagination and the experiences of individuals with aphantasia, who have difficulty consciously conjuring mental images. It could shed light on how visual imagery impacts our perception of reality.