アファンタジアの世界の発見

アファンタジア

最大4%の人が、心の中でイメージを思い描くことのない世界で生きています。それが、2015年に発見された「アファンタジア」です。アファンタジアは、人間の認知の多様性の一つです。アファンタジアネットワークは、心の目を使わずに生きるアファンタジアについて理解し、探求するための場所です。

アファンタジアネットワークに参加して、私の人生は変わりました! 私は、アファンタジアが私の足かせになっていると思っていました。しかし、今は、イメージにとらわれない思考が私の特別な力なのだと理解しています。

side profile of a women, thinking deeply and visualizing. Imagined with midjourney.

アファンタジアの新着情報

Research
Aphantasia reimagined
Phillips, I. (2025). Aphantasia reimagined. Nous (Detroit, Mich.). doi:10.1111/nous.12551
In this research paper, philosopher and cognitive scientist Ian Phillips offers a new perspective on aphantasia—the inability to visualize in the mind’s eye—that helps explain a long-standing puzzle: why do people who report no mental imagery still perform normally on tasks that seem to require it? Phillips argues that the confusion stems from a flawed assumption that all mental imagery can be measured along a single scale of vividness. Instead, he introduces a key distinction between two types of imagery: *visual-object imagery* (the ability to picture detailed scenes, colors, or shapes) and *spatial imagery* (the ability to mentally manipulate objects or understand spatial layouts). While people with aphantasia often lack visual-object imagery, many retain strong spatial imagery, which supports their performance on tasks like mental rotation or memory for object placement—even if they don’t consciously “see” anything. Because standard questionnaires focus narrowly on visual vividness, they miss this preserved ability. By recognizing these different forms of imagery, Phillips proposes that aphantasia is not a total absence of mental imagery but a varied set of imagery differences, similar to how perception itself can be selectively impaired. This more nuanced understanding better captures the diversity of aphantasic experience and calls for improved tools that reflect the full range of our inner worlds.
Research
Mental imagery abilities in different modalities moderate the efficacy of cognitive bias modification for interpretation bias in social anxiety
Lam, C. L. M., Hin, A. S., Lau, L. N. S., Zhang, Z., & Leung, C. J. (2025). Mental imagery abilities in different modalities moderate the efficacy of cognitive bias modification for interpretation bias in social anxiety. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, (102031), 102031. doi:10.1016/j.jbtep.2025.102031
A new study reveals that individual differences in mental imagery ability significantly impact the effectiveness of Cognitive Bias Modification for Interpretation (CBM-I) therapy for social anxiety. The research involved 72 participants with high social anxiety who completed either a 5-day online CBM-I intervention or a control condition. The CBM-I training helped participants develop more positive interpretations of ambiguous social situations, resulting in reduced negative interpretation bias and decreased social anxiety symptoms (11-18% reduction). Most importantly, the study found that participants with stronger mental imagery abilities—particularly in emotional feelings—benefited substantially more from the intervention. Those with higher imagery vividness showed greater reductions in both negative interpretation bias and social anxiety symptoms compared to those with lower imagery abilities. This finding helps explain why CBM-I treatments sometimes yield inconsistent results across different individuals. The researchers suggest that clinicians should assess mental imagery ability before offering CBM-I therapy, as people with limited imagery capacity might benefit more from modified versions of the treatment that specifically enhance imagery generation. This research holds particular relevance for the aphantasia community, suggesting that those with limited visual imagery might respond differently to certain therapeutic approaches, and that alternative treatment modifications focusing on emotional rather than visual imagery could potentially be more effective for individuals with aphantasia experiencing social anxiety.