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Content determination in dreams supports the imagination theory

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02250-3
Gregory, D. (2024). Content determination in dreams supports the imagination theory. Philosophical Studies, 181(11), 3037–3057. doi:10.1007/s11098-024-02250-3

Abstract

There are two leading theories about the ontology of dreams. One holds that dreams involve hallucinations and beliefs. The other holds that dreaming involves sensory and propositional imagining. I highlight two features of dreams which are more easily explained by the imagination theory. One is that certain things seem to be true in our dreams, even though they are not represented sensorily; this is easily explained if dreams involve propositional imagining. The other is that dream narratives can be temporally segmented, involving events which take place across long spans of time; this makes sense if dreams involve sensory imagining, for we often sensorily imagine narratives during wakefulness in the same way. The two considerations are unified by the fact that both highlight forms of content determination characteristic of imagining.

Authors

  • Daniel Gregory1

Understanding the Nature of Dreams: Imagination vs. Hallucination

Overview/Introduction

Dreams have fascinated humans for centuries, and understanding their nature has been a subject of debate among philosophers and scientists alike. Two primary theories attempt to explain what dreams are: one suggests that dreams are akin to hallucinations and beliefs, while the other proposes that they are a form of sensory and propositional imagining. This paper explores these theories, providing evidence that supports the imagination theory, which suggests that dreams are more about imagining than experiencing hallucinations.

Methodology

The study delves into the characteristics of dreams that align more closely with the imagination theory. By examining dream narratives and the nature of experiences within dreams, the research identifies features that are better explained by imagining rather than hallucinations. The paper uses philosophical analysis to compare how dreams are constructed and perceived, drawing parallels with how we imagine scenarios while awake.

Key Findings

  • Propositional Imagining: In dreams, certain things seem true even without sensory representation. This aligns with the idea of propositional imagining, where we imagine propositions as true without sensory input.
  • Temporal Segmentation: Dream narratives often jump across time, similar to how we imagine stories in segments. This supports the notion that dreams involve sensory imagining, as we often imagine narratives in a segmented manner while awake.
  • Content Determination: Both features highlight how we determine the content of our dreams, akin to how we label and assign meaning to our imaginations.

Implications

  • Understanding Dream Content: If dreams are more about imagining, this could change how we interpret dream content and its relevance to our waking life.
  • Therapeutic Approaches: Recognizing dreams as imaginative processes might influence therapeutic techniques, using dreams as a tool for exploring creativity and problem-solving.
  • Philosophical Insights: The findings challenge traditional views of dreams as mere hallucinations, offering a new perspective on the nature of consciousness and mental processes during sleep.

Limitations

  • Hybrid Theories: The paper does not entirely dismiss the role of hallucinations and beliefs in dreams, suggesting that a hybrid theory might still hold validity.
  • Abductive Reasoning: The arguments presented are abductive, meaning they offer the best explanation based on current evidence but are not conclusive.
In conclusion, this research supports the imagination theory of dreams, suggesting that dreaming involves a complex interplay of sensory and propositional imagining. This perspective not only enriches our understanding of dreams but also opens new avenues for exploring the human mind's imaginative capabilities.