Research library
Papers about aphantasia and mental imagery, with summaries in plain words. The summaries are generated by AI and may contain errors.
Want to take part? See the studies you can join.
Running a study? We can help you recruit participants.
Monzel, Reuter and Schultz · L’Année psychologique
Aphantasic participants leaned more than controls toward calling a moving dot not alive, with no clear difference in how fast they gathered evidence. Slower responses in aphantasia may reflect a starting lean rather than slower processing.
Monzel and colleagues · Consciousness and Cognition
VVIQ items showed high redundancy for identifying aphantasia, with inter-item correlations ranging from .79 to .90. A single screening question about visualizing a familiar place achieved high specificity (98.8%) and sensitivity (97.5%) against the strictest definition of core aphantasia (VVIQ = 16), suggesting the full 16-item questionnaire is unnecessary for screening purposes.
Scholz and colleagues · Neuropsychologia
Researchers found that aphantasics activate sensory precursors that lack the perceptual geometry of true imagery. This suggests aphantasia is a failure of multi-stage integration rather than just a lack of neural reactivation.
Monzel and colleagues · Cortex
People with aphantasia recalled fewer letters than others from a grid flashed for 50 milliseconds, but not from one shown for 5 seconds. This suggests imagery helps hold a split-second visual trace, while other strategies work given more time.
Le Clézio and colleagues · Neuropsychologia
In an online reasoning task, 57 typical imagers were about 2.4 seconds slower on problems built on visual relations, such as cleaner or dirtier, than on spatial problems or ones that are hard to picture, repeating an earlier finding that visual content can slow reasoning. The 47 people with weak or no imagery were also slower on visual problems, by about 1.7 seconds, but less clearly, and whether the two groups truly differed was unclear. Accuracy did not clearly differ between groups.
Kvamme and colleagues · Neuropsychologia
Among people with aphantasia, those with more (though still weak) imagery reported more alexithymia and anxiety, the reverse of typical imagers. The authors suggest faint imagery may prompt emotional processing that fails.
Zeman and colleagues · Trends in Cognitive Sciences
Replying to a proposal that aphantasia reflects broken mental "rendering," this letter argues that conscious object imagery is unlikely to be a useless by-product. Links with memory, empathy and emotion suggest it may support social life.
Monzel, Nagai and Silvanto · Scientific Reports
People with aphantasia report significantly lower interceptive awareness and emotional engagement with bodily signals. This suggests that mental imagery plays a key role in linking internal bodily states to the recall of personal memories.
Monzel and colleagues · Behavior Research Methods
Using existing data from 111 people, 38 classed as having little or no imagery, the authors propose a new way to score a test in which imagining a colored pattern makes it more likely to be seen when each eye sees a different pattern. Counting trials where people saw a mix, instead of dropping them, made the score agree better with self-reported imagery, but only when few clear trials were recorded. The score explained about a tenth of the variation in self-reports, and the authors judge it better at separating groups than individuals and too weak to classify one person.
Scholz, Monzel and Liu · Current Biology
Neural activity in aphantasia during imagery tasks lacks the perception-like representational overlap found in typical imagers. This suggests that neural activity in aphantasics reflects alternative non-perceptual strategies rather than unconscious mental imagery.
Monzel and colleagues · Cognition
Aphantasics showed a reduced Stroop effect for accuracy compared to controls, though response times remained similar. This suggests that mental imagery contributes to the interference between words and colors by competing with actual perception.
Bilzer and Monzel · Vision
In an online survey, 226 adults rated how vivid their imagery is for sight, sound, smell, taste, touch, body sensation and emotion, when imagining on purpose and in recent dreams; 158 repeated it four weeks later. Ratings for each sense were linked across waking imagery and dreams, but ratings were more closely linked within each state than across them, so the two are related but partly separate. Dreams felt more emotional, while sound, smell, taste and touch were weaker in dreams. The link between waking and dream imagery was stronger in people who often recall dreams or have lucid dreams.
Monzel and colleagues · Psychophysiology
People with aphantasia achieved successful fear extinction through propositional thought despite lacking mental imagery. This suggests that imaginal exposure therapy may be effective for aphantasic individuals by relying on non-visual cognitive processes.
Zeman and colleagues · Cortex
This short definition, published in a special issue of the journal Cortex, describes aphantasia as the absence or near-absence of imagery, most often the inability to picture things while fully awake, as opposed to simply thinking about them. Aphantasia affects deliberate imagery, may affect spontaneous imagery, and often leaves imagery in dreams intact. It can be lifelong or acquired, and the note proposes labels such as visual, auditory, multisensory and global aphantasia, while recording that some researchers keep the word for vision alone.
Monzel, Karneboge and Reuter · Biomarkers in Neuropsychiatry
Aphantasia is linked to reduced physiological and self-reported sympathy for verbal scenarios and slower emotion recognition in others. This suggests mental imagery is a key mechanism for amplifying emotional and empathic responses.
Monzel and colleagues · eLife
People with aphantasia recalled fewer event, emotion and sensory details from their own lives than controls. During recall their hippocampus was less active, their visual cortex more active, and the two lacked the coupling seen in controls.
Vetterlein and colleagues · Neurobiology of Pain
In a brain-scanning study of 82 healthy adults, people imagined themselves in everyday painful situations, such as burning a lip on a hot drink, and matched painless ones, shown as pictures or text. Imagining pain raised activity in frontal, motor, body-sensing and parietal areas and the cerebellum, regions earlier studies link to pain, and also in visual areas. Pain sensitivity and sense of control did not predict this activity. With no real-pain comparison, the authors call the evidence for shared brain activity between imagined and felt pain preliminary, and imagery ability was not measured.
Krempel and Monzel · Consciousness and Cognition
In a new experiment, people with aphantasia rated afterimages as fainter than typical imagers did. Together with a review of other studies, this suggests aphantasia affects images that arise on their own, not only ones made on purpose.
Monzel, Handlogten and Reuter · Cognition
People with aphantasia do not experience the verbal overshadowing effect, which typically impairs face recognition after verbal description. This suggests that visual mental imagery is a necessary component for this memory interference to occur.
Monzel, Karneboge and Reuter · Journal of Neuroscience Research
Researchers are investigating whether transiently reducing dopamine synthesis through an amino acid mixture decreases the strength of voluntary mental imagery. This study could reveal the neurochemical basis of aphantasia and identify potential targets for imagery-enhancing interventions.