AphantasiaResearch
Explore a comprehensive collection of academic papers, research studies, and scientific publications about aphantasia, imagery, and cognitive neuroscience.
Autonomic, neurodevelopmental, and early adversity correlates of acquired aphantasia
Aphantasia (the inability to voluntarily generate mental imagery) has traditionally been studied as a congenital or neurological condition. However, historical and clinical reports also implicate affective and stress-related factors in the onset of imagery loss, which are themselves associated with disrupted interoception and autonomic nervous system dysfunction. To investigate these links, we surveyed individuals with self-identified acquired aphantasia (N = 59) using structured questions and validated questionnaires assessing early adversity (Childhood Trauma Questionnaire), anxiety symptoms (GAD-7), autonomic reactivity (Body Perception Questionnaire–Short Form; Atrial Fibrillation Symptoms Questionnaire), and neurodevelopmental traits (AQ-10, ASRS-6). 62 % of participants reported psychological triggers for their aphantasia, 41 % cited neurological or physiological events, and 30 % identified pharmacological factors. Nearly half of the participants described a combination of these influences, with psychological factors frequently co-occurring with medication use or physical events, suggesting that acquired aphantasia may oftenhave multifactorial origins rather than a single isolated cause. Compared to typical imagers, individuals with acquired aphantasia reported significantly higher levels of childhood trauma and increased supra-diaphragmatic autonomic reactivity, as well as significantly elevated scores on measures of ADHD and autism. These findings suggest that acquired aphantasia may not only follow neurological injury but can also emerge in the context of affective conditions shaped by early adversity and neurodevelopmental vulnerability. Affective disturbances may contribute to imagery loss by altering the subjective experience of autonomic signals and disrupting the integration of bodily, emotional, and cognitive information required to generate vivid mental representations. In conclusion, these results support an affective-autonomic pathway to acquired aphantasia.
Gao, W., Nagai, Y., & Silvanto, J. (2025). Autonomic, neurodevelopmental, and early adversity correlates of acquired aphantasia. Neuropsychologia, 219, 109272. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2025.109272
Interoception, insula, and agency: a predictive coding account of aphantasia
Aphantasia results from disrupted insula processing that impairs interoceptive precision, weakening top-down predictions needed for mental imagery. Unlike perception, imagery relies entirely on internally generated predictions, making it uniquely vulnerable to interoceptive deficits.
Silvanto, J. (2025). Interoception, insula, and agency: a predictive coding account of aphantasia. Frontiers in Psychology, 16. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2025.1564251
How Interoception and the Insula Shape Mental Imagery and Aphantasia
This paper proposes that mental imagery depends on integrating sensory processing with interoceptive bodily signals through the insula. Aphantasia likely reflects dysfunction in this integration system, explaining its associations with memory, emotion, and motor coordination deficits. Character count: 237
Silvanto, J., & Nagai, Y. (2025). How interoception and the insula shape mental imagery and aphantasia. Brain Topography, 38(2). doi:10.1007/s10548-025-01101-6
Mental imagery as part of an ‘inwardly focused’ cognitive style
Mental imagery reflects an inwardly focused cognitive style characterized by interoceptive attention and personality traits like Openness and Conscientiousness. This cluster negatively correlates with alexithymia, linking vivid imagery to better emotional awareness.
Kvamme, T. L., Sandberg, K., & Silvanto, J. (2024). Mental imagery as part of an ‘inwardly focused’ cognitive style. Neuropsychologia, 204, 108988. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2024.108988
Only minimal differences between individuals with congenital aphantasia and those with typical imagery on neuropsychological tasks that involve imagery
People with aphantasia perform as accurately as typical imagers on neuropsychological tasks despite lacking visual imagery experience. Response time differences suggest they may use alternative cognitive strategies to complete these tasks.
Pounder, Z., Jacob, J., Evans, S., Loveday, C., Eardley, A. F., & Silvanto, J. (2022). Only minimal differences between individuals with congenital aphantasia and those with typical imagery on neuropsychological tasks that involve imagery. Cortex, 148, 180–192. doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2021.12.010
Visual working memory performance in aphantasia
Aphantasic individuals lack mental imagery but show deficits only in high-precision visual working memory tasks. This reveals mental imagery has a specific functional role in precision-based visual cognition.
Jacobs, C., Schwarzkopf, D. S., & Silvanto, J. (2018). Visual working memory performance in aphantasia. Cortex, 105, 61–73. doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2017.10.014
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