Research library
Papers about aphantasia and mental imagery, with summaries in plain words. The summaries are generated by AI and may contain errors.
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Kvamme, Nagai and Silvanto · Trends Open
In this opinion article, the authors propose that the brain's processing of body signals, centered on the anterior insula, is a shared source of both mental imagery and emotion. On this view, conditions such as depression, anxiety, PTSD, autism and ADHD change imagery because they disturb this same system, and body-focused treatments might help restore imagery. The authors say the causal direction has not yet been shown and call for long-term and treatment studies to test it.
Scholz and colleagues · Neuropsychologia
Researchers found that aphantasics activate sensory precursors that lack the perceptual geometry of true imagery. This suggests aphantasia is a failure of multi-stage integration rather than just a lack of neural reactivation.
Silvanto · Frontiers in Psychology
Mental imagery likely evolved from interoceptive processing to provide affectively-grounded simulations for decision-making. This suggests that aphantasia may stem from a decoupling of sensory information and internal bodily signals.
Silvanto · Cortex
A commentary argues that whether to treat aphantasia depends on subtype. Imagery lost after trauma or stress is the clearest candidate, with care aimed at underlying problems; lifelong absent imagery without impairment is variation, not pathology.
Kvamme and colleagues · Neuropsychologia
Among people with aphantasia, those with more (though still weak) imagery reported more alexithymia and anxiety, the reverse of typical imagers. The authors suggest faint imagery may prompt emotional processing that fails.
Kvamme and colleagues · Heliyon
In 591 young adults, more vivid imagery went with an inward-focused style: attention to body signals, mindfulness, and openness. In statistical models, imagery related to mental health only through this style, partly through lower alexithymia.
Gao, Nagai and Silvanto · Neuropsychologia
People who lost their mental imagery reported more childhood trauma, anxiety, heart and breathing symptoms, and ADHD and autism traits than typical imagers. This suggests acquired aphantasia can follow emotional pathways as well as brain injury.
Monzel, Nagai and Silvanto · Scientific Reports
People with aphantasia report significantly lower interceptive awareness and emotional engagement with bodily signals. This suggests that mental imagery plays a key role in linking internal bodily states to the recall of personal memories.
Kvamme and colleagues · NeuroImage
In about 550 adults scanned in Poland and Denmark, researchers compared brain wiring and resting brain activity with how vividly people rated their imagery. More vivid imagery went with tighter local connections around the left fusiform gyrus, a high-level visual area, in resting activity; with more tightly clustered wiring in visual cortex; and with better-connected wiring of the right insula. Each link was small: together they accounted for about 3% of the differences between people.
Silvanto · Frontiers in Psychology
In this short opinion piece, the author proposes that aphantasia arises when the insula, a brain region that tracks signals from inside the body, gives those signals too little weight. On this account, the frontal signals that should build an image are then too weak to activate visual areas, and the sense of control over one's own mental acts is weakened. Because the problem lies in voluntary control, the account fits reports that many people with aphantasia still dream in pictures. The author acknowledges that this is a theoretical model with limited direct evidence so far.
Silvanto and Nagai · Brain Topography
Researchers propose that mental imagery requires the integration of sensory information with internal physiological signals via the insula and anterior cingulate cortex. This suggests aphantasia may stem from a failure to ground sensory simulations in bodily experience.
Kvamme, Sandberg and Silvanto · Neuropsychologia
In this short opinion piece, with no new data, the authors propose that vivid imagery belongs to a wider habit of paying attention to one's own inner life: body signals, emotions and thoughts. They link this habit to openness, conscientiousness and extraversion, and expect it to run opposite to difficulty recognizing and describing feelings. They leave open whether turning attention inward builds imagery or vivid imagery draws attention inward, and warn that vividness ratings may partly reflect personality and habits of description.
Pounder and colleagues · Cortex
Twenty people with aphantasia were as accurate as 20 typical imagers on tests of memory, spatial span, planning and mental rotation. Differences appeared only in speed: they slowed more than controls as a planning puzzle got harder.
Jacobs, Schwarzkopf and Silvanto · Cortex
A woman with lifelong aphantasia was compared with 11 women with typical imagery on memory tests. She was as accurate as them on a task meant to need imagery, judging whether a dot fell inside a shape that was named but not shown, though she was worse than IQ-matched controls at telling her right answers from her wrong ones. She did worse only on the hardest trials of a matching visual memory task. The authors suggest she uses other strategies that work in most conditions but lose out when fine visual detail is needed; this is a single case.