Back to all research

Proposal for a consistent definition of aphantasia and hyperphantasia: A response to Lambert and Sibley (2022) and Simner and Dance (2022)

Monzel, M., Mitchell, D., Macpherson, F., Pearson, J., & Zeman, A. (2022). Proposal for a consistent definition of aphantasia and hyperphantasia: a response to lambert and sibley (2022) and simner and dance (2022). Cortex, 152, 74–76. doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2022.04.003

Authors

  • Merlin Monzel23
  • David Mitchell2
  • Fiona Macpherson4
  • Joel Pearson28
  • Adam Zeman14

Standardizing the Language of Mental Imagery: Defining Aphantasia and Hyperphantasia

This article addresses ongoing debates about how to best define and label extreme variations in mental imagery, specifically aphantasia (absence of imagery) and hyperphantasia (exceptionally vivid imagery). Written by an international team including Merlin Monzel (University of Bonn), David Mitchell (New College of the Humanities), Fiona Macpherson (University of Glasgow), Joel Pearson (University of New South Wales), and Adam Zeman (University of Exeter), the research responds to critiques from other scholars in the field and proposes standardized definitions that balance scientific precision with practical application.

Core Arguments for Unified Terminology

The authors defend using "aphantasia" as a broad, flexible term for three key reasons:
1. Consistency in Use: While "aphantasia" was initially coined for visual imagery, research quickly revealed that imagery reduction often affects multiple senses. Studies show that 54.2% of people with aphantasia experience reduced imagery across all modalities, and 26% have multisensory aphantasia. The authors argue that using one core term with modality qualifiers (e.g., "visual," "auditory") is simpler than creating entirely new vocabulary.
2. Handling Dissociations: The authors acknowledge that people can have aphantasia in one sense while experiencing hyperphantasia in another (e.g., visual aphantasia with auditory hyperphantasia). They contend that their proposed terminology handles these variations clearly through qualifiers like "multisensory aphantasia" or "global aphantasia."
3. Avoiding Visuocentrism: While agreeing that visual imagery has dominated research, the authors argue that proliferating terms for each sensory modality isn't necessary. Just as "mental imagery" encompasses all senses, "aphantasia" can extend to touch ("tactile aphantasia"), movement ("motor aphantasia"), and emotion ("emotional aphantasia") without creating confusing new vocabulary.

Proposed Working Definitions

Aphantasia: The "absence or marked reduction of voluntary sensory imagery," where imagery means "the quasi-sensory experience of items, typically in their absence."
Key characteristics include:
  • Can be acquired (from neurological or psychiatric injury) or lifelong (often familial)
  • Affects voluntary imagery specifically (many people report spontaneous "flashes" or dream imagery)
  • Can be single-modality (e.g., visual or auditory) or affect multiple/all modalities
Hyperphantasia: The opposite of aphantasia—unusually strong mental imagery that rivals the vividness of actual perception. Like aphantasia, it can affect single or multiple sensory modalities.

Important Clarification

The authors emphasize that aphantasia does not mean lack of imagination broadly. Many highly creative individuals have aphantasia, demonstrating that the absence of sensory imagery doesn't eliminate creative or imaginative thinking—it simply means the cognitive process occurs differently.
The research advocates for terminology that balances scientific precision with practical usability, acknowledging that empirical work will ultimately determine which terms become standard in the field.