The perspective-simulating mind: internal representations in moral judgment and action

Abstract

Mental imagery is a simulation process, yet its representational format is rarely measured in moral cognition. We tested whether spontaneously adopted imagery perspective (first- vs. third-person) and imagery vividness relate to moral evaluation in trolley dilemmas. In an online sample (N = 156), participants read either a switch or footbridge scenario, judged moral acceptability and willingness to act (order randomized), and after each judgment reported imagery vividness (1-6; including a "no imagery" option) and perspective. We replicated the classic asymmetry: acceptability and willingness were far higher in the switch than the footbridge dilemma. Imagery perspective was largely consistent within persons across the two judgments, indicating a stable simulation stance. In the footbridge dilemma, third-person simulation was associated with higher moral acceptability than first-person simulation, whereas no association emerged in the switch dilemma; perspective did not meaningfully alter willingness to act. Vividness showed no robust scenario differences, but action-related imagery was more vivid than judgment-related imagery, and some participants reported no visual imagery for at least one judgment. These findings identify reported representational perspective as a relevant marker of mental simulation during moral evaluation, while leaving open whether perspective guides judgment formation or is reconstructed after the judgment.

Authors

• Martin Ernst2
• Martin Kronbichler2
• Patric Meyer2

The perspective-simulating mind: internal representations in moral judgment and action

Abstract

Mental imagery is a simulation process, yet its representational format is rarely measured in moral cognition. We tested whether spontaneously adopted imagery perspective (first- vs. third-person) and imagery vividness relate to moral evaluation in trolley dilemmas. In an online sample (N = 156), participants read either a switch or footbridge scenario, judged moral acceptability and willingness to act (order randomized), and after each judgment reported imagery vividness (1-6; including a "no imagery" option) and perspective. We replicated the classic asymmetry: acceptability and willingness were far higher in the switch than the footbridge dilemma. Imagery perspective was largely consistent within persons across the two judgments, indicating a stable simulation stance. In the footbridge dilemma, third-person simulation was associated with higher moral acceptability than first-person simulation, whereas no association emerged in the switch dilemma; perspective did not meaningfully alter willingness to act. Vividness showed no robust scenario differences, but action-related imagery was more vivid than judgment-related imagery, and some participants reported no visual imagery for at least one judgment. These findings identify reported representational perspective as a relevant marker of mental simulation during moral evaluation, while leaving open whether perspective guides judgment formation or is reconstructed after the judgment.

Authors

• Martin Ernst2
• Martin Kronbichler2
• Patric Meyer2