Aphantasia: a philosophical approach

Abstract

In the last six or seven years, aphantasia has received attention from media outlets, television shows, and social networks. This alleged condition, however, has hardly been discussed in the philosophy of mind. In this paper, I assess some of the research conducted in cognitive science and provide, for the first time in the literature, a comprehensive assessment of possible explanations for aphantasia. Specifically, the hypotheses I submit for consideration ascribe the reports of absence of visual imagery to (i) a discrepancy at the level of concepts, (ii) a failure of attentional mechanisms that modulate introspection, (iii) a lack of personal-level access to sub-personal imagistic representations, and (iv) an absence of sub-personal imagistic representations. I conclude that hypotheses (i) and (ii) can be rejected while hypotheses (iii) and (iv) can be accepted as defensible candidates for explaining aphantasia, although the latter is better suited to account for the available evidence in both comparative and absolute terms. Finally, I present some educated guesses and empirical research that could shed further light on the study of this condition.

What This Study Is About

This research explores whether people with aphantasia—the inability to create mental images—actually have "hidden" imagery that they simply cannot consciously see. The study examines different theories to explain why some people report a "blind mind's eye" and looks for physical evidence that might prove these reports are accurate.

How They Studied It

The researcher reviewed existing scientific experiments and philosophical theories. They focused on two specific types of objective tests that don't rely on what a person says they see:

Binocular Rivalry: A test where different images are shown to each eye. Usually, "priming" the brain by imagining one of the images first influences which one the person sees.

Pupillometry: A test that measures how pupils react. In most people, pupils shrink when they imagine a bright light, just as they do when looking at a real light.

The study compared how people who identify as aphantasic performed on these tests compared to "visualizers" (people with typical mental imagery).

What They Found

The study found that people with aphantasia show clear, measurable physical differences from visualizers. In the binocular rivalry tests, imagining an image did not "prime" their vision at all—their results were no different than random chance. In the pupil tests, their pupils did not shrink when they tried to imagine bright objects. These results suggest that aphantasia is not just a "description" problem or a failure to notice one's own thoughts, but a genuine absence of the physiological processes that create mental images.

What This Might Mean

This suggests that aphantasia is a real, objective condition rather than a misunderstanding of language or a lack of self-awareness. It supports the "Absence" theory—that the brain's visual hardware simply isn't producing the image. However, the researcher notes that for some, the imagery might still exist at a "sub-personal" level (deep in the brain's processing) but is "disconnected" from conscious awareness.

One Interesting Detail

While most people's pupils automatically constrict when they imagine the sun, people with aphantasia show no such pupil reaction, providing a "built-in" lie detector test for the mind's eye.

Aphantasia: a philosophical approach

Abstract

Authors

Aphantasia: a philosophical approach

Abstract

Authors

Aphantasia: a philosophical approach

Abstract

Authors

Aphantasia: a philosophical approach

Abstract

Authors

What This Study Is About

How They Studied It

What They Found

What This Might Mean

One Interesting Detail

What This Study Is About

How They Studied It

What They Found

What This Might Mean

One Interesting Detail

Joel Pearson

Merlin Monzel

Adam Zeman

Rebecca Keogh

Martin Reuter

Juha Silvanto

Paolo Bartolomeo

Carla Dance

Jianghao Liu

Fraser Milton