Aphantasia: a philosophical approach
Abstract
In the last six or seven years, aphantasia has received attention from media outlets, television shows, and social networks. This alleged condition, however, has hardly been discussed in the philosophy of mind. In this paper, I assess some of the research conducted in cognitive science and provide, for the first time in the literature, a comprehensive assessment of possible explanations for aphantasia. Specifically, the hypotheses I submit for consideration ascribe the reports of absence of visual imagery to (i) a discrepancy at the level of concepts, (ii) a failure of attentional mechanisms that modulate introspection, (iii) a lack of personal-level access to sub-personal imagistic representations, and (iv) an absence of sub-personal imagistic representations. I conclude that hypotheses (i) and (ii) can be rejected while hypotheses (iii) and (iv) can be accepted as defensible candidates for explaining aphantasia, although the latter is better suited to account for the available evidence in both comparative and absolute terms. Finally, I present some educated guesses and empirical research that could shed further light on the study of this condition.
Authors
- Joel J. Lorenzatti1
Understanding Aphantasia: A Philosophical Perspective
Overview/Introduction
Methodology
- Conceptual Discrepancy: Differences in how individuals describe their mental experiences.
- Introspective Failure: A failure in attentional mechanisms that prevent awareness of mental imagery.
- Disconnection: A lack of personal-level access to sub-personal imagistic representations.
- Absence: A complete absence of sub-personal imagistic representations, with individuals using alternative cognitive strategies.
Key Findings
- Rejection of Conceptual Discrepancy and Introspective Failure: These hypotheses were dismissed as they do not account for the behavioral and neurological differences observed between aphantasics and visualizers.
- Support for Disconnection and Absence: Both hypotheses are considered viable, with the Absence hypothesis being more strongly supported by current evidence. This suggests that aphantasics may genuinely lack sub-personal imagistic representations.
- Behavioral and Neurological Evidence: Studies show that aphantasics perform similarly to visualizers in tasks requiring visual imagery, despite reporting no mental images. This supports the idea that they use different cognitive strategies.
Implications
- Cognitive Diversity: Acknowledging aphantasia highlights the diversity in cognitive processing and challenges assumptions about the universality of mental imagery.
- Philosophical Inquiry: The study calls for clearer definitions of terms like "consciousness," "experience," and "awareness" in philosophical and scientific contexts.
- Further Research: The paper suggests that future studies could explore alternative cognitive strategies used by aphantasics, potentially offering insights into how the brain compensates for the lack of visual imagery.
Limitations
- Hypotheses are not exhaustive: Other explanations for aphantasia may exist.
- Need for more empirical research: Further studies, particularly using advanced imaging techniques, are necessary to confirm the hypotheses and explore the neurological basis of aphantasia.