Does episodic memory require mental imagery? The case of aphantasia

Abstract

In this paper we challenge the commonly held view that episodic memory necessarily involves conscious sensory mental imagery and, more generally, that it is best characterized in terms of the reexperiencing of past events. We do so based on the case of aphantasia, a condition that affects one’s ability to generate sensory mental images. If episodic memory necessarily involves sensory imagery, then global aphantasics should lack episodic memory. We compare aphantasics with patients with severe episodic amnesia and argue that, unlike them, aphantasics are capable of retrieving and representing events from their personal past. We also consider and reject the objection that aphantasics remember past events solely by means of semantic memory, and not episodic memory. In particular, we argue that aphantasics’ memories can include contextual information tied to a specific past occurrence, represented as belonging to one’s personal past. The upshot is that episodic memory does not depend on conscious sensory imagery. We conclude by proposing a characterization of episodic memory which highlights the importance of mental representations carrying specific contextual information regarding past personally experienced events, while remaining neutral about the conscious vehicles of those representations.