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Absence of shared representation in the visual cortex challenges unconscious imagery in aphantasia

DOI: 10.1016/j.cub.2025.05.009
Tags:
Visual AphantasiaHypophantasiaCognition
Scholz, C. O., Monzel, M., & Liu, J. (2025). Absence of shared representation in the visual cortex challenges unconscious imagery in aphantasia. Current Biology, 35(13), R645–R646. doi:10.1016/j.cub.2025.05.009

Abstract

Aphantasia is defined as the absence (or near-absence) of imagery experience, most commonly in but not necessarily limited to the visual modality. While the neural and cognitive underpinnings of aphantasia remain hotly debated (see Zeman1 for a recent review), a proposal that has recently gained attention is that people with aphantasia may have unconscious mental imagery2, meaning that despite lacking the experience associated with imagery, they may still possess the relevant neural activity. A recent article in Current Biology by Chang et al.3 reported finding ‘imageless imagery’ in aphantasic subjects, thus seemingly supporting this view. However, we argue here that the representations found in aphantasic subjects by Chang et al.3, as well as in other studies (e.g., by Liu et al.4,5), should not be viewed as unconscious imagery because they fail to show the perception-like pattern usually associated with mental imagery.

Authors

  • Christian O. Scholz4
  • Merlin Monzel23
  • Jianghao Liu4