Insights into embodied cognition and mental imagery from aphantasia

Abstract

Mental representations allow humans to think about, remember and communicate about an infinite number of concepts. A key question within cognitive psychology is how the mind stores and accesses the meaning of concepts. Embodied theories propose that concept knowledge includes or requires simulations of the sensory and physical interactions of one’s body with the world, even when a concept is subsequently processed in a context unrelated to those interactions. However, the nature of these simulations is highly debated and their mechanisms underspecified. Insight into whether and how simulations support concept knowledge can be derived from studying related mental representations, such as mental imagery. In particular, research into the inability to form mental imagery, known as aphantasia, can advance understanding of mental imagery and mental simulations. In this Review, we provide an overview of embodied theories of cognition, review research in mental imagery and consider how simulation and mental imagery might overlap. We then synthesize the growing aphantasia literature and discuss how aphantasia can be used to test predictions derived from theories of embodied cognition. Embodied theories propose that concept knowledge involves simulations of sensory information. In this Review, Muraki et al. discuss how studying individuals with an inability to form mental images can provide insight into the relationship between mental imagery and these mental simulations.

Authors

• Emiko J. Muraki2
• Laura J. Speed4
• Penny M. Pexman2

Insights into embodied cognition and mental imagery from aphantasia

Abstract

Mental representations allow humans to think about, remember and communicate about an infinite number of concepts. A key question within cognitive psychology is how the mind stores and accesses the meaning of concepts. Embodied theories propose that concept knowledge includes or requires simulations of the sensory and physical interactions of one’s body with the world, even when a concept is subsequently processed in a context unrelated to those interactions. However, the nature of these simulations is highly debated and their mechanisms underspecified. Insight into whether and how simulations support concept knowledge can be derived from studying related mental representations, such as mental imagery. In particular, research into the inability to form mental imagery, known as aphantasia, can advance understanding of mental imagery and mental simulations. In this Review, we provide an overview of embodied theories of cognition, review research in mental imagery and consider how simulation and mental imagery might overlap. We then synthesize the growing aphantasia literature and discuss how aphantasia can be used to test predictions derived from theories of embodied cognition. Embodied theories propose that concept knowledge involves simulations of sensory information. In this Review, Muraki et al. discuss how studying individuals with an inability to form mental images can provide insight into the relationship between mental imagery and these mental simulations.

Authors

• Emiko J. Muraki2
• Laura J. Speed4
• Penny M. Pexman2