Insights into embodied cognition and mental imagery from aphantasia
Abstract
Mental representations allow humans to think about, remember and communicate about an infinite number of concepts. A key question within cognitive psychology is how the mind stores and accesses the meaning of concepts. Embodied theories propose that concept knowledge includes or requires simulations of the sensory and physical interactions of one’s body with the world, even when a concept is subsequently processed in a context unrelated to those interactions. However, the nature of these simulations is highly debated and their mechanisms underspecified. Insight into whether and how simulations support concept knowledge can be derived from studying related mental representations, such as mental imagery. In particular, research into the inability to form mental imagery, known as aphantasia, can advance understanding of mental imagery and mental simulations. In this Review, we provide an overview of embodied theories of cognition, review research in mental imagery and consider how simulation and mental imagery might overlap. We then synthesize the growing aphantasia literature and discuss how aphantasia can be used to test predictions derived from theories of embodied cognition. Embodied theories propose that concept knowledge involves simulations of sensory information. In this Review, Muraki et al. discuss how studying individuals with an inability to form mental images can provide insight into the relationship between mental imagery and these mental simulations.
Authors
- Emiko J. Muraki1
- Laura J. Speed3
- Penny M. Pexman1
Understanding the Mind's Eye: Insights from Aphantasia
Overview/Introduction
Methodology
Key Findings
- Embodied Cognition: Theories suggest that our understanding of concepts involves simulating sensory and motor experiences. For example, thinking about an apple might involve imagining its color, taste, and texture.
- Aphantasia: Individuals with aphantasia lack the ability to form mental images, which provides a unique opportunity to study the role of imagery in cognition.
- Cognitive Processing: Despite their lack of mental imagery, people with aphantasia can perform tasks that typically rely on imagery, suggesting they use alternative strategies.
- Neural Activity: Studies indicate that mental imagery involves specific brain regions, and aphantasia might be linked to differences in neural connectivity.
Implications
- Understanding Cognition: Aphantasia challenges the idea that mental imagery is essential for all cognitive processes. It suggests that people can rely on other forms of knowledge, such as linguistic or factual information, to understand concepts.
- Educational Strategies: Recognizing that some individuals may not use mental imagery can lead to more inclusive educational approaches that cater to different cognitive styles.
- Further Research: Aphantasia offers a natural experiment to test theories of embodied cognition and understand the variability in human cognitive processing.
Limitations
- Variability in Aphantasia: There is significant individual variability in aphantasia, with some people experiencing deficits in multiple sensory modalities while others do not.
- Measurement Challenges: Assessing mental imagery relies on self-report measures, which can be subjective and influenced by individual differences in introspection.