AphantasiaResearch
Explore a comprehensive collection of academic papers, research studies, and scientific publications about aphantasia, imagery, and cognitive neuroscience.
Absence of shared representation in the visual cortex challenges unconscious imagery in aphantasia
Aphantasia is defined as the absence (or near-absence) of imagery experience, most commonly in but not necessarily limited to the visual modality. While the neural and cognitive underpinnings of aphantasia remain hotly debated (see Zeman1 for a recent review), a proposal that has recently gained attention is that people with aphantasia may have unconscious mental imagery2, meaning that despite lacking the experience associated with imagery, they may still possess the relevant neural activity. A recent article in Current Biology by Chang et al.3 reported finding ‘imageless imagery’ in aphantasic subjects, thus seemingly supporting this view. However, we argue here that the representations found in aphantasic subjects by Chang et al.3, as well as in other studies (e.g., by Liu et al.4,5), should not be viewed as unconscious imagery because they fail to show the perception-like pattern usually associated with mental imagery.
Scholz, C. O., Monzel, M., & Liu, J. (2025). Absence of shared representation in the visual cortex challenges unconscious imagery in aphantasia. Current Biology, 35(13), R645–R646. doi:10.1016/j.cub.2025.05.009
Aphantasia as a functional disconnection
Brain scans reveal that people with aphantasia, who can't visualize images mentally, still process visual information normally. The issue lies in reduced communication between brain areas responsible for visual imagery and conscious awareness, explaining why they remember visual details without experiencing mental images.
Liu, J., & Bartolomeo, P. (2025). Aphantasia as a functional disconnection. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2025.05.012
Visual mental imagery in typical imagers and in aphantasia: A millimeter-scale 7-T fMRI study
Around 4% of people have aphantasia, meaning they can't visualize objects but can describe them. Using advanced brain imaging, researchers found that while aphantasics activate similar brain areas as typical imagers, they have reduced connectivity between key brain regions, suggesting a disconnect in processing visual information internally.
Liu, J., Zhan, M., Hajhajate, D., Spagna, A., Dehaene, S., Cohen, L., & Bartolomeo, P. (2025). Visual mental imagery in typical imagers and in aphantasia: a millimeter-scale 7-t fmri study. Cortex, 185, 113–132. doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2025.01.013
Probing the unimaginable: The impact of aphantasia on distinct domains of visual mental imagery and visual perception
People with aphantasia, who lack visual mental imagery, process visual information more slowly but with similar accuracy as others. They also have less confidence in their perception tasks. This suggests aphantasia involves slower processing and possibly different strategies to access visual information.
Liu, J., & Bartolomeo, P. (2023). Probing the unimaginable: the impact of aphantasia on distinct domains of visual mental imagery and visual perception. Cortex, 166, 338–347. doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2023.06.003
Visual mental imagery engages the left fusiform gyrus, but not the early visual cortex: A meta-analysis of neuroimaging evidence
The dominant neural model of visual mental imagery (VMI) stipulates that memories from the medial temporal lobe acquire sensory features in early visual areas. However, neurological patients with damage restricted to the occipital cortex typically show perfectly vivid VMI, while more anterior damages extending into the temporal lobe, especially in the left hemisphere, often cause VMI impairments. Here we present two major results reconciling neuroimaging findings in neurotypical subjects with the performance of brain-damaged patients: (1) A large-scale meta-analysis of 46 fMRI studies, of which 27 investigated specifically visual mental imagery, revealed that VMI engages fronto-parietal networks and a well-delimited region in the left fusiform gyrus. (2) A Bayesian analysis showed no evidence for imagery-related activity in early visual cortices. We propose a revised neural model of VMI that draws inspiration from recent cytoarchitectonic and lesion studies, whereby fronto-parietal networks initiate, modulate, and maintain activity in a core temporal network centered on the fusiform imagery node, a high-level visual region in the left fusiform gyrus.
Spagna, A., Hajhajate, D., Liu, J., & Bartolomeo, P. (2021). Visual mental imagery engages the left fusiform gyrus, but not the early visual cortex: a meta-analysis of neuroimaging evidence. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 122, 201–217. doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2020.12.029
You've reached the end of the references.