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Aphantasia as a challenge for humean abstraction

DOI: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2026.109465
Tooming, U., & Jakapi, R. (2026). Aphantasia as a challenge for humean abstraction. Neuropsychologia, 227, 109465. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2026.109465

Abstract

This paper critically assesses David Hume’s imagistic theory of thought in light of aphantasia. Central to Hume’s theory is the claim that abstraction requires imaginative operations on individual ideas that are mental representations derived from sensory impressions. We present a challenge to Hume’s account of abstraction by drawing on empirical and philosophical insights about aphantasia. Our argument proceeds as follows. If Hume is right, then abstract thinking depends on being able to imaginatively use individual ideas in a specific way. However, since individual ideas in Hume’s framework can be identified with mental imagery, individuals with severe aphantasia, who arguably can’t imaginatively use mental imagery, should be unable to engage in abstract thought. Yet, they are able to think abstractly. Therefore, Hume’s view faces a challenge: abstraction does not seem to require the imaginative use of individual ideas. This reveals a significant limitation not only in Hume’s account, but also in imagistic models of cognition more broadly. • Humean abstraction requires specific imaginative uses of mental imagery • Severe aphantasia challenges imagistic views of abstraction • The hypothesis of unconscious imagery is insufficient to explain abstract thought in aphantasics • Humeans can’t ignore aphantasia as a mere exception to their theory

Authors

  • Uku Tooming1
  • Roomet Jakapi1

What This Study Is About

This study explores whether you actually need to "see" pictures in your head to think about big, general ideas. The researchers tested an old theory which claims that human thought is basically just a collection of mental images, using aphantasia (the inability to create mental images) as a real-world test case.

How They Studied It

This wasn't a lab experiment with new volunteers; instead, the authors acted like "science detectives." They analyzed a wide range of existing scientific data—including brain scans (fMRI), pupil dilation tests, and memory studies—involving hundreds of people with and without aphantasia. They then compared these modern findings to the 300-year-old theories of philosopher David Hume to see if his ideas about how the mind works still hold up.

What They Found

The researchers found that the old "mental picture" theory has a major problem:
  • Abstract Thinking: People with aphantasia are perfectly capable of abstraction—the ability to understand general concepts like "freedom" or "triangles" without needing to see a specific one in their mind.
  • No "Hidden" Pictures: Some scientists thought aphantasics might have "unconscious" images they just can't see, but this study points to evidence (like the lack of eye-shiver or pupil changes) suggesting many truly have no mental images at all.
  • Logic over Images: The study found that aphantasics often use verbal or logical strategies to solve problems that others solve with pictures, proving that "thinking" and "picturing" are two different things.

What This Might Mean

This suggests that the human mind is much more flexible than we used to think. It implies that mental imagery (the "mind's eye") is just one tool in a toolbox, not the engine that powers our entire intelligence. While this paper makes a strong logical case, it is a philosophical analysis of existing data rather than a new clinical trial, so it "suggests" a new way of looking at the mind rather than "proving" exactly how aphantasic thought works.

One Interesting Detail

The authors discuss a famous puzzle called "The Missing Shade of Blue." An old theory suggested that if you saw every shade of blue except one, your mind could "fill in the gap" by imagining it. This paper argues that for someone with aphantasia, the *entire* rainbow is "missing" from their mental screen, yet they can still understand and talk about color perfectly!
This summary was generated by AI and may contain errors. Always refer to the original paper for accuracy.