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Aphantasia Logo
Back to all research
Aphantasia Logo

Building awareness and understanding of aphantasia through research, education, and community support.

About

  • What is Aphantasia?
  • What is Hyperphantasia?
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  • Getting Started
  • Newsletter
  • About Us
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Community

  • Premium Membership
  • Find support
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Ask AI About This Paper
Ask AI About This Paper

Aphantasia as a challenge for humean abstraction

DOI: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2026.109465
Tags:
Theory & Definitions
Tooming, U., & Jakapi, R. (2026). Aphantasia as a challenge for humean abstraction. Neuropsychologia, 227, 109465. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2026.109465

Abstract

This paper critically assesses David Hume’s imagistic theory of thought in light of aphantasia. Central to Hume’s theory is the claim that abstraction requires imaginative operations on individual ideas that are mental representations derived from sensory impressions. We present a challenge to Hume’s account of abstraction by drawing on empirical and philosophical insights about aphantasia. Our argument proceeds as follows. If Hume is right, then abstract thinking depends on being able to imaginatively use individual ideas in a specific way. However, since individual ideas in Hume’s framework can be identified with mental imagery, individuals with severe aphantasia, who arguably can’t imaginatively use mental imagery, should be unable to engage in abstract thought. Yet, they are able to think abstractly. Therefore, Hume’s view faces a challenge: abstraction does not seem to require the imaginative use of individual ideas. This reveals a significant limitation not only in Hume’s account, but also in imagistic models of cognition more broadly. • Humean abstraction requires specific imaginative uses of mental imagery • Severe aphantasia challenges imagistic views of abstraction • The hypothesis of unconscious imagery is insufficient to explain abstract thought in aphantasics • Humeans can’t ignore aphantasia as a mere exception to their theory

Authors

  • Uku Tooming1
  • Roomet Jakapi1

Aphantasia as a challenge for humean abstraction

DOI: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2026.109465
Tags:
Theory & Definitions
Tooming, U., & Jakapi, R. (2026). Aphantasia as a challenge for humean abstraction. Neuropsychologia, 227, 109465. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2026.109465

Abstract

This paper critically assesses David Hume’s imagistic theory of thought in light of aphantasia. Central to Hume’s theory is the claim that abstraction requires imaginative operations on individual ideas that are mental representations derived from sensory impressions. We present a challenge to Hume’s account of abstraction by drawing on empirical and philosophical insights about aphantasia. Our argument proceeds as follows. If Hume is right, then abstract thinking depends on being able to imaginatively use individual ideas in a specific way. However, since individual ideas in Hume’s framework can be identified with mental imagery, individuals with severe aphantasia, who arguably can’t imaginatively use mental imagery, should be unable to engage in abstract thought. Yet, they are able to think abstractly. Therefore, Hume’s view faces a challenge: abstraction does not seem to require the imaginative use of individual ideas. This reveals a significant limitation not only in Hume’s account, but also in imagistic models of cognition more broadly. • Humean abstraction requires specific imaginative uses of mental imagery • Severe aphantasia challenges imagistic views of abstraction • The hypothesis of unconscious imagery is insufficient to explain abstract thought in aphantasics • Humeans can’t ignore aphantasia as a mere exception to their theory

Authors

  • Uku Tooming1
  • Roomet Jakapi1
Aphantasia Logo

What This Study Is About

This research explores a philosophical puzzle: if a famous historical theory says we need mental pictures to think about general concepts, how do people with aphantasia manage to think? The authors examine the work of philosopher David Hume, who argued that "abstract ideas" (like the general concept of a "triangle" or "friendship") are actually just specific mental images we use to represent a whole group of things.

How They Studied It

This is a philosophical analysis rather than a laboratory experiment. The researchers compared David Hume’s 18th-century theories of the mind with modern scientific findings on aphantasia—the inability to voluntarily create mental imagery (the "mind's eye"). They looked at whether Hume’s explanation of how humans think can still hold up now that we know some people do not have these mental images at all.

What They Found

The authors found that aphantasia poses a major challenge to Hume’s theory. According to Hume, if you can't form a mental image, you shouldn't be able to form abstract thoughts. However, people with aphantasia clearly can think about complex, abstract concepts. The researchers looked at several "fixes" for this problem—such as the idea that aphantasics might use "unconscious" images or non-visual senses—but concluded that none of these fully solve the conflict.

What This Might Mean

This suggests that historical theories of the mind that rely heavily on "imagism" (the idea that thinking is just picturing) may be incomplete or incorrect. It implies that human cognition is more flexible than previously thought and that abstract reasoning does not strictly require a "mind's eye." This highlights the need for new theories of how the brain handles concepts without using sensory-like pictures.

One Interesting Detail

The study points out that for Hume, the "imagination" is what gives us the freedom to rearrange ideas, while "memory" is stuck in a fixed order. Because aphantasics lack this visual imagination, a strict follower of Hume might be forced to wrongly conclude that aphantasics are "devoid of reason."
This summary was generated by AI and may contain errors. Always refer to the original paper for accuracy.
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