Research Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews

Outlining a brain model of mental imaging abilities

FawAugust 1998

Abstract
What This Study Is About
How They Studied It
What They Found
What This Might Mean
One Interesting Detail
Authors
Cite this paper

Abstract

This paper outlines a brain model of mental imaging abilities by reviewing neuropsychological evidence of the association and dissociation between mental imaging processes and known perceptual mechanisms; differentiating between visual-mode and auditory-mode thought systems; pointing to brain arousal systems involved in waking and dream imaging; and exploring pre-frontal involvement in deliberate imaging and cognitive state monitoring. In the process, the paper develops an emerging distinction between objective-imagery and subjective-imagery abilities. It ends by suggesting possible brain models for in-born and clinical loss of subjective imaging abilities.

Our summary in plain words

What This Study Is About

This paper explores how the brain creates mental images and why some people, known as "natural non-imagers" (now called aphantasia), lack this ability. The author proposes a biological model to explain how we "see" with the mind's eye and why some people can dream in pictures even if they cannot visualize while awake.

How They Studied It

The author, who identifies as a lifelong non-imager, conducted a deep review of existing brain research and clinical case studies. He compared "subjective imagery" (the actual experience of seeing a picture in your mind) with "objective imagery" (the ability to solve spatial puzzles or describe objects from memory). The paper examines evidence from patients with brain injuries, sleep studies, and psychological tests to map out which parts of the brain are responsible for different types of mental imaging.

What They Found

The research highlights a major discovery: being able to "see" a mental image is a separate brain process from being able to "use" visual information. Key findings include:

The "Blind" Mind's Eye: Some people can perfectly describe a person's face or draw an object from memory (objective imagery) but report seeing absolutely nothing in their minds (subjective imagery).

Dreaming vs. Waking: Many people with aphantasia still experience vivid, colorful dreams, suggesting the brain uses different "triggers" for imagery during sleep than it does during wakefulness.

Brain Regions: The study suggests the frontal lobes are responsible for "holding" and manipulating images, while other areas create the sensory "picture" itself.

What This Might Mean

This suggests that aphantasia isn't a lack of memory or imagination, but rather a specific "disconnection" in the brain's ability to bring visual data into conscious awareness. It implies that there are multiple ways to be a non-imager—some might be born that way (congenital), while others might lose the ability due to injury or even psychological factors. The study reminds us that "objective" tests of imagination often fail to capture the true internal experience of aphantasic individuals.

One Interesting Detail

The author proposes a "Blindsight Model" for aphantasia: just as some legally blind people can unconsciously navigate around obstacles, people with aphantasia can often "navigate" mental maps and visual memories without ever actually "seeing" them.

This summary was written with AI and may contain errors. Check the original paper.

Authors

Bill Faw
1 paper in the library

Cite this paper

Faw, B. (n.d.). Outlining a brain model of mental imaging abilities. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 21(3), 283–288. doi:10.1016/s0149-7634(96)00026-7

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Research Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews

Outlining a brain model of mental imaging abilities

FawAugust 1998

Read the paper

Abstract
What This Study Is About
How They Studied It
What They Found
What This Might Mean
One Interesting Detail
Authors
Cite this paper

Abstract

Our summary in plain words

What This Study Is About

How They Studied It

What They Found

The research highlights a major discovery: being able to "see" a mental image is a separate brain process from being able to "use" visual information. Key findings include:

The "Blind" Mind's Eye: Some people can perfectly describe a person's face or draw an object from memory (objective imagery) but report seeing absolutely nothing in their minds (subjective imagery).

Dreaming vs. Waking: Many people with aphantasia still experience vivid, colorful dreams, suggesting the brain uses different "triggers" for imagery during sleep than it does during wakefulness.

Brain Regions: The study suggests the frontal lobes are responsible for "holding" and manipulating images, while other areas create the sensory "picture" itself.

What This Might Mean

One Interesting Detail

This summary was written with AI and may contain errors. Check the original paper.

Authors

Bill Faw
1 paper in the library

Cite this paper

Faw, B. (n.d.). Outlining a brain model of mental imaging abilities. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 21(3), 283–288. doi:10.1016/s0149-7634(96)00026-7

Topics

Most-cited researchers

Recruit participants for your study

We can help you reach people across the imagery spectrum, from aphantasia to hyperphantasia.

Partner with us

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2026

Vividness of mental imagery reflects a broad range of internally generated visual experiences

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Vividness ratings robustly capture a wide range of subjective experiences, from internal mental depictions to externally projected imagery. This suggests aphantasia should be redefined to distinguish between faint imagery and a total lack of pictorial representation.

2025

Mental imagery, predictive processing, aphantasia, and the interaction between philosophy and cognitive science: Responses to Amy Kind, Christian Scholz, and Neil Van Leeuwen

Nanay · Mind & Language

Aphantasia is not a monolithic condition, as many individuals retain involuntary imagery like dreams despite lacking voluntary control. This suggests that mental imagery relies on multiple distinct processes that can break down independently.

2024

Content determination in dreams supports the imagination theory

Gregory · Philosophical Studies

The imagination theory of dreaming explains how dreams use temporal segmentation and mental labeling to determine content. This suggests that dreams are a form of sensory imagining rather than hallucinations or beliefs.

Image-Free Insights

A short note from our founder, Tom Ebeyer, every other week, plus occasional news and invitations to take part in studies. Change what you get from any email.