Brain-Computer Interface tool use and the Contemplation Conundrum: a blueprint of mental action, agency, and control

MehtaJune 2025

Abstract
What This Study Is About
How They Studied It
What They Found
What This Might Mean
One Interesting Detail
Authors
Cite this paper

Abstract

This paper approaches the role of intentional action in brain-computer interface (BCI) tool use to allow for an ethical discourse regarding the development and usage of neurotechnology. The exploration of mental actions and user control in BCI tool use brings us closer to understanding the philosophical underpinnings of intentions and agency for BCI-mediated actions. The author presents that under some theories of intentional action, certain BCI-mediated overt movements qualify as both voluntary and unintentional. This plausibly magnifies the ethical considerations surrounding BCI tool use. This problem is referred by the author as the contemplation conundrum. Thus, the paper proposes research scope for the neural correlates of intention formation and the neural correlates of imagination aimed at clarifying implementational control and safeguarding privacy of thought in BCI tool use.

Our summary in plain words

What This Study Is About

This research explores how people use brain-computer interfaces (BCIs)—devices that turn thoughts into actions—and whether the movements these devices make are always what the user truly intended. It specifically looks at how "motor imagery" (imagining a movement) acts as the bridge between a thought and a computer-controlled action.

How They Studied It

This was a philosophical and theoretical study rather than a laboratory experiment with new participants. The researcher analyzed the real-world case of "P1" (Noland Arbaugh), the first human to receive a Neuralink brain implant. By looking at how P1 uses mental imagery to move a computer cursor or play chess, the author examined the "causal chain" of how a mental act becomes a physical result. The study compared these BCI actions against established theories of how the human brain normally processes intentions and movements.

What They Found

The researcher identified a problem called the "contemplation conundrum." Because BCIs rely on motor imagery—the ability to "picture" or feel a movement in the mind—the device might accidentally pick up on a thought the user was only considering, rather than one they decided to act on. The study found that:

BCI actions are "non-basic," meaning they require an extra mental step (imagining) that normal body movements don't need.

Vivid mental imagery makes the brain signals stronger and easier for the computer to read.

Because the brain uses similar pathways for "thinking about" and "doing," a user might move a cursor voluntarily but still feel it was unintentional if the computer grabbed the wrong "overlapping" thought.

What This Might Mean

This suggests that for people with aphantasia (who cannot visualize) or those with varying levels of motor imagery, using a BCI might feel different or have different levels of accuracy. If a device requires "vivid" imagery to work well, people who lack that internal "picture" or "feeling" might face unique challenges. It also raises ethical questions: if a computer acts on a thought you were only "contemplating," are you still responsible for that action?

One Interesting Detail

The study notes that for a BCI user, imagining a movement is a "basic mental act"—for them, the act of imagining is the exact same thing as a person without an implant physically raising their hand.

This summary was written with AI and may contain errors. Check the original paper.

Authors

Dvija Mehta
King’s College, University of Cambridge; Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence, University of Cambridge , 16 Mill Ln, Cambridge CB2 1SB, Cambridgeshire,
1 paper in the library

Cite this paper

Mehta, D. (2025). Brain-computer interface tool use and the contemplation conundrum: a blueprint of mental action, agency, and control. Oxford Open Neuroscience, 4. doi:10.1093/oons/kvaf002

Topics

Most-cited researchers

Recruit participants for your study

We can help you reach people across the imagery spectrum, from aphantasia to hyperphantasia.

Partner with us

Image-Free Insights

A short note from our founder, Tom Ebeyer, every other week, plus occasional news and invitations to take part in studies. Change what you get from any email.

Research Oxford Open Neuroscience

Brain-Computer Interface tool use and the Contemplation Conundrum: a blueprint of mental action, agency, and control

MehtaJune 2025

Read the paper

Abstract
What This Study Is About
How They Studied It
What They Found
What This Might Mean
One Interesting Detail
Authors
Cite this paper

Abstract

Our summary in plain words

What This Study Is About

How They Studied It

What They Found

BCI actions are "non-basic," meaning they require an extra mental step (imagining) that normal body movements don't need.

Vivid mental imagery makes the brain signals stronger and easier for the computer to read.

Because the brain uses similar pathways for "thinking about" and "doing," a user might move a cursor voluntarily but still feel it was unintentional if the computer grabbed the wrong "overlapping" thought.

What This Might Mean

One Interesting Detail

This summary was written with AI and may contain errors. Check the original paper.

Authors

Dvija Mehta
King’s College, University of Cambridge; Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence, University of Cambridge , 16 Mill Ln, Cambridge CB2 1SB, Cambridgeshire,
1 paper in the library

Cite this paper

Mehta, D. (2025). Brain-computer interface tool use and the contemplation conundrum: a blueprint of mental action, agency, and control. Oxford Open Neuroscience, 4. doi:10.1093/oons/kvaf002

Topics

Most-cited researchers

Recruit participants for your study

We can help you reach people across the imagery spectrum, from aphantasia to hyperphantasia.

Partner with us

More research

All research

2026

Imaginary Presence—Merleau-Ponty and Mental Imagery

Deery · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

This philosophy paper asks how Merleau-Ponty's ideas would explain the perception-like feel of mental images. It argues that neither the view of images as perceptual representations nor the view of them as simulations explains that feel, and proposes instead that imagining something means partly taking up the bodily stance one would have if it were really there, bringing a vague sense of how it could look. In a footnote, the author suggests that people with aphantasia keep this capacity for perception but cannot use it on purpose to make absent things appear, while calling aphantasia beyond the paper's scope.

2026

Imagery in affective and neurodevelopmental conditions: an insula-based interoceptive framework

Kvamme, Nagai and Silvanto · Trends Open

In this opinion article, the authors propose that the brain's processing of body signals, centered on the anterior insula, is a shared source of both mental imagery and emotion. On this view, conditions such as depression, anxiety, PTSD, autism and ADHD change imagery because they disturb this same system, and body-focused treatments might help restore imagery. The authors say the causal direction has not yet been shown and call for long-term and treatment studies to test it.

2026

Seeing without eyes: Relation between visual mental imagery and visual hallucinations

Panigutti and colleagues · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews

This systematic review found only 11 studies on imagery and hallucinations in Parkinson's, Alzheimer's and schizophrenia, and none in Lewy body dementia. Seven reported a link and four did not, so the evidence is indecisive.

Image-Free Insights

A short note from our founder, Tom Ebeyer, every other week, plus occasional news and invitations to take part in studies. Change what you get from any email.