Alexander of Aphrodisias on Mental Representation
HangaiDecember 2025
Abstract
Alexander took phantasia as a capacity separate from perception by appealing to differences in their defining objects. While the object of perception is external, that of phantasia is internal: a residue of perceptual activity. What is it in virtue of which the residue represents its content? I argue for a causal account: a residue represents in virtue of preserving fully some content that originates in perception with which it has causal continuity , sometimes involving internal causal mechanisms ( impressing further and picturing ) that modify the residue. I suggest that this account can serve as a foundation for explaining representation.
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What This Study Is About
How They Studied It
What They Found
- Mental images are "causally continuous" with the real world, meaning they are direct leftovers from what we have actually seen.
- The mind has internal mechanisms called "impressing further" and "picturing" that can modify these traces.
- These modifications explain why we can imagine things that don't exist or why our memories might be slightly different from reality.
What This Might Mean
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Authors
Attila Hangai
ELTE Research Centre for the Humanities Institute of Philosophy Tóth Kálmán utca 4 Budapest Hungary
1 paper in the library
Cite this paper
Hangai, A. (2025). Alexander of aphrodisias on mental representation. Rhizomata, 13(2), 183–223. doi:10.1515/rhiz-2025-0007
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