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An integration model of mental imagery and aphantasia: Conceptual framework, neuromechanistic pathways, and clinical implications

DOI: 10.31234/osf.io/u7fxz_v1
Scholz, C. O., Monzel, M., Kvamme, T. L., Liu, J., & Silvanto, J. (2026). An integration model of mental imagery and aphantasia: conceptual framework, neuromechanistic pathways, and clinical implications. Neuropsychologia, 225, 109401. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2026.109401

Abstract

Aphantasia, the strong diminution or complete absence of mental imagery, challenges long-standing views of imagery as central to cognition. Competing accounts variously explain the phenomenon as a failure of sensory reactivation or as unconscious mental imagery. Here, we propose a new framework, the integration model of aphantasia, which argues that reactivated sensory information must undergo multi-stage integration to yield imagery experience. Against unconscious imagery accounts, we argue that the neural activations observed in aphantasics are not imagery but sensory precursors: rudimentary sensory codes that lack perceptual status. Only when sensory precursors are locally integrated do they become perceptual representations, and only when these are further integrated with interoceptive signals do they give rise to conscious imagery experience. We present the integration model as a dual-stream framework that unifies recent attention- and interoception-based accounts, situate it within existing theories of mental imagery and aphantasia, and highlight its clinical relevance. In doing so, we reframe the debate on unconscious imagery and draw attention to the role of multi-stage integration as a key mechanism underlying mental imagery and its absence across different subtypes of aphantasia.

Authors

  • Christian O. Scholz5
  • Merlin Monzel30
  • Timo L. Kvamme5
  • Jianghao Liu9
  • Juha Silvanto14

What This Study Is About

Researchers wanted to understand why some people have aphantasia—the inability to create mental imagery (the "mind's eye" or the ability to picture things in your head). They proposed a new theory suggesting that seeing a mental image isn't just one simple step; it’s like a recipe that requires several "brain ingredients" to be mixed together perfectly.

How They Studied It

This wasn't a typical experiment with a group of participants in a lab. Instead, it was a "framework paper." The scientists analyzed years of existing research, including brain scans and psychological tests from both aphantasic and typical-imaging groups. They combined all this evidence to build a new, comprehensive "blueprint" of how the brain constructs a conscious thought-picture.

What They Found

The researchers discovered that aphantasia might not be a total "blank" in the brain. Instead:
  • The Raw Data is There: The brain likely still creates "sensory precursors"—tiny, unconscious bits of information about shapes and colors.
  • The "Glue" is Missing: In a typical brain, these bits are "glued" together using attention and internal body signals. In aphantasia, this integration process fails.
  • Unconscious vs. Conscious: Because the bits aren't integrated, they stay hidden in the unconscious. It’s like having all the Lego bricks for a castle (the data) but being unable to click them together to see the final model (the image).

What This Might Mean

This suggests that aphantasia is a "disconnection" issue rather than a "missing part" issue. It implies there could be different "subtypes" of aphantasia depending on which part of the integration process—the "glueing" stage—isn't working. However, because this is a theoretical model based on previous data, we can't be 100% certain yet. Scientists will need to run specific new experiments to see if this "integration" theory holds up in real-time brain scans.

One Interesting Detail

The study suggests a fascinating link between mental images and interoception—your ability to feel what’s happening inside your body, like your heartbeat. It suggests that "seeing" a picture in your mind might actually depend on how well your brain connects visual data to your internal bodily feelings!
This summary was generated by AI and may contain errors. Always refer to the original paper for accuracy.