The conceptual groundwork: what aphantasia actually is, how it's been defined, and where those definitions still get debated.
Delem and colleagues · Neuropsychologia
Researchers found that individuals with aphantasia scored lower across all sensory imagery modalities but performed similarly to controls on spatial and cognitive tasks. This suggests that multisensory imagery deficits do not hinder general cognitive or spatial reasoning abilities.
Wymark and colleagues · Journal of the Neurological Sciences
Aphantasics showed higher brain entropy in frontal and temporal lobes and performed better on tasks when imagery was absent. This suggests aphantasia is a unique cognitive processing mode rather than a neurological deficit.
Balaban and Ullman · Trends in Cognitive Sciences
Researchers propose that the mind separates physical simulation from graphical rendering, much like a game engine. This suggests aphantasia may be a case of "broken rendering" where underlying spatial and physical representations remain intact.
Bartolomeo · Neuropsychologia
In a short conceptual paper, the author proposes sorting aphantasia into at least three forms: neurological, psychogenic and congenital. He offers it as an initial taxonomy for research that has reached contradictory conclusions.
Larner · Neuropsychologia
Historical reports of congenital and acquired aphantasia exist dating back to the late 19th century. This provides a sound epistemic basis for the retrospective diagnosis of aphantasia and supports its status as a transhistorical condition.
Lebon · Cortex
Individuals with aphantasia show decodable activity in early visual cortices during imagery tasks despite lacking conscious visual experience. This suggests that neural activation in V1 does not necessarily equate to subjective mental imagery.
Cavazos and colleagues · Frontiers in Psychology
Students with aphantasia did not differ from students with vivid imagery in broad study approaches, and described workarounds such as lists and talking things through. This suggests imagery helps some learners but is not needed to learn.
Kwaśniak and colleagues · Scientific Reports
People with aphantasia showed reduced activation in the right middle frontal gyrus and right motor cortex during motor imagery tasks. This suggests that aphantasia involves differences in attentional switching and neural processing beyond just visual imagery.
Mckilliam and Kirberg · Consciousness and Cognition
Researchers found that current evidence for unconscious mental imagery in aphantasia is inconclusive due to potential response biases and non-imagistic strategies. This highlights the need for objective physiological markers to distinguish between truly unconscious imagery and unreported conscious experiences.
Zeman · Neuropsychologia
Ten years after aphantasia was named, Adam Zeman argues it likely has several subtypes and that most abilities are spared, with memory for one's own past differing most. He urges an open mind in this young field.
Muraki and Pexman · Neuropsychologia
People with aphantasia showed typical semantic processing effects for both motor and visual word properties. This indicates that conscious mental imagery is not required for the sensorimotor simulations that support word meaning.
Megla, Prasad and Bainbridge · Cerebral Cortex
Researchers found that an aphantasic twin had surprisingly similar brain activity to their imager twin during memory tasks despite lacking visual imagery. This suggests aphantasia may be a spectrum with more preserved visual information than previously thought.
Abdelrahman, Melcher and Ripollés · Psychophysiology
People with aphantasia felt less emotionally engaged by audio and video stories than typical imagers, though they followed them as well. Only typical imagers had higher heart rates for audiobooks than videos, which suggests imagery takes effort.
Scholz, Monzel and Liu · Current Biology
Neural activity in aphantasia during imagery tasks lacks the perception-like representational overlap found in typical imagers. This suggests that neural activity in aphantasics reflects alternative non-perceptual strategies rather than unconscious mental imagery.
Speed, Geraerds and McRae · Memory & Cognition
People with aphantasia used unconscious mental simulation to verify object properties as effectively as controls. This suggests that mental simulation and conscious visual imagery are distinct and separable cognitive processes.
Liu and Bartolomeo · Trends in Cognitive Sciences
In this Letter, the authors propose that aphantasia involves weaker functional links between high-level visual areas and the left prefrontal cortex. They argue this may explain how visual knowledge survives without imagery, pending confirmation.
Scholz · Mind & Language
Researchers argue that people with aphantasia do not possess unconscious mental imagery despite their ability to solve visual tasks. This suggests that aphantasics rely on alternative non-visual strategies rather than hidden sensory processes.
Monzel and colleagues · Cognition
Aphantasics showed a reduced Stroop effect for accuracy compared to controls, though response times remained similar. This suggests that mental imagery contributes to the interference between words and colors by competing with actual perception.
Lorenzatti · Philosophical Psychology
Aphantasics report a lack of visual imagery during reading, resulting in characters and places without specific visual properties. This suggests that mental imagery is necessary for assigning detailed, involuntary visual traits to fictional narratives.
Nanay · Mind & Language
Aphantasia is not a monolithic condition, as many individuals retain involuntary imagery like dreams despite lacking voluntary control. This suggests that mental imagery relies on multiple distinct processes that can break down independently.