Research library
Papers about aphantasia and mental imagery, with summaries in plain words. The summaries are generated by AI and may contain errors.
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Silvanto · Frontiers in Psychology
Mental imagery likely evolved from interoceptive processing to provide affectively-grounded simulations for decision-making. This suggests that aphantasia may stem from a decoupling of sensory information and internal bodily signals.
Cavazos and colleagues · Frontiers in Psychology
Students with aphantasia did not differ from students with vivid imagery in broad study approaches, and described workarounds such as lists and talking things through. This suggests imagery helps some learners but is not needed to learn.
Cui, Kong and Zhang · Frontiers in Psychology
Aphantasic participants showed muted neural responses and minimal autonomic changes during romantic imagery compared to those with vivid imagery. This suggests that mental imagery is a crucial driver of physiological and emotional arousal.
Silvanto · Frontiers in Psychology
In this short opinion piece, the author proposes that aphantasia arises when the insula, a brain region that tracks signals from inside the body, gives those signals too little weight. On this account, the frontal signals that should build an image are then too weak to activate visual areas, and the sense of control over one's own mental acts is weakened. Because the problem lies in voluntary control, the account fits reports that many people with aphantasia still dream in pictures. The author acknowledges that this is a theoretical model with limited direct evidence so far.
Wright and colleagues · Frontiers in Psychology
Researchers found that 0.9% of people have aphantasia and 3.3% have hypophantasia in a large global sample. This highlights the need to account for imagery differences in research and clinical settings.
Bouyer and Arnold · Frontiers in Psychology
Deep aphantasia may involve atypical sensory experiences where perception is minimally shaped by prior expectations or feedback. This suggests some forms of aphantasia impact both voluntary imagery and the processing of actual visual inputs.
Incekara and Blom · Frontiers in Psychology
Reading Carl Jung's journals and other self-reports, the authors argue that many of his unusual experiences, such as a mental image of a dead friend so vivid that he considered getting up to follow it, reflected extremely vivid imagery (hyperphantasia) rather than a psychotic illness. They suggest he was probably born with this vividness and developed it through a practice he called active imagination. They accept that some daytime hallucinations were psychotic symptoms, which are fairly common in people without a disorder, and call for research on hyperphantasia in psychotic experiences.
Takahashi and colleagues · Frontiers in Psychology
In an online survey of 2,871 Japanese adults, 3.7% had low scores on a standard imagery questionnaire, but 12.1% said they could not, or could barely, picture things such as furniture or a friend's face, and the two groups overlapped poorly. A second survey of 774 adults suggested part of the gap comes from people with poor face recognition answering the face part of the question. Among those with low questionnaire scores, some reported weak imagery in every sense and others mainly in vision, so the authors recommend using several measures, including other senses.
Cavedon-Taylor · Frontiers in Psychology
Aphantasia may primarily involve a lack of voluntary imagery while leaving involuntary imagery intact. This distinction suggests that aphantasics might still be susceptible to psychological disorders driven by intrusive, non-voluntary mental images.
Hinwar and Lambert · Frontiers in Psychology
In 128 adults, many recruited through aphantasia groups, self-rated visual and auditory imagery were strongly linked, and 82% of 34 aphantasic people had absent or nearly absent auditory imagery. Rare exceptions showed the two can come apart.
MacKisack and colleagues · Frontiers in Psychology
The paper traces the long philosophical history of mental imagery, from Aristotelian "phantasma" to behaviorist skepticism. This historical context reveals that modern neuroscientific debates over imagery's role in cognition are rooted in centuries of conflicting intellectual traditions.
Jung, Flores and Hunter · Frontiers in Psychology
Eighty young adults spent about two weeks on an online task, writing down goals, imagined scenes and inventions over four sessions and then rating their engagement, satisfaction and progress; those ten ratings make up the Hunter Imagination Questionnaire. Higher scores went with a larger hippocampus and lingual gyrus and a smaller nucleus accumbens and parts of the default mode network, but not with overall creative achievement. The questionnaire asks how people felt about their own ideas and the task rather than measuring imagery, and the brain links are exploratory.
Arshamian and Larsson · Frontiers in Psychology
This short review compares imagining smells with imagining sights and sounds. In many studies smell imagery behaves like the others, but people differ far more in it, and most find it hard to call up a smell. The authors link stronger smell imagery to knowing odor names, interest in smells, and experience such as daily cooking or perfumery, and suggest regular exposure to smells may help. Most of this evidence compares experienced people with novices at one point in time, so it cannot show that practice caused the difference.
Rademaker and Pearson · Frontiers in Psychology
Researchers found that five days of mental imagery training improved participants' metacognitive accuracy but did not increase imagery strength. This suggests that introspective ability and imagery production rely on distinct neural mechanisms.