Discover the World of Aphantasia

Can You Picture This?

Imagine a world where up to 4% of people can't create mental images. That's the reality of aphantasia, a fascinating variation in human cognition discovered in 2015. Aphantasia Network is your hub for understanding, exploring, and embracing life without a mind's eye.

Joining Aphantasia Network has changed my life! I really thought aphantasia was holding me back, but now I understand that image-free thinking is my superpower.

side profile of a women, thinking deeply and visualizing. Imagined with midjourney.

Latest Aphantasia Activity

Research
Imageless imagery in aphantasia revealed by early visual cortex decoding
Chang, S., Zhang, X., Cao, Y., Pearson, J., & Meng, M. (2025). Imageless imagery in aphantasia revealed by early visual cortex decoding. Current Biology: CB. doi:10.1016/j.cub.2024.12.012
Scientists have traditionally believed that activity in the primary visual cortex directly relates to conscious visual experiences, including mental imagery. This study examined this relationship in people with aphantasia - who cannot voluntarily create mental images - by measuring brain activity patterns during both perception and attempted imagery. The research revealed several surprising findings: While both aphantasic and non-aphantasic individuals showed decodable brain activity during imagery attempts, people with aphantasia displayed distinctly different neural patterns. Their brain activity during imagery appeared on the opposite side than expected and couldn't be matched to their patterns during actual perception. Additionally, aphantasic individuals showed reduced brain response when physically viewing things compared to people without aphantasia. These results suggest that people with aphantasia do maintain some form of imagery-related representation in their visual cortex, but it contains transformed rather than absent sensory information. This challenges our fundamental understanding of how activity in the visual cortex relates to conscious visual experiences, indicating the relationship is more complex than previously thought.
Research
Objective priming from pre-imagining inputs before binocular rivalry presentations does not predict individual differences in the subjective intensity of imagined experiences
Bouyer, L. N., Schwarzkopf, D. S., Saurels, B. W., & Arnold, D. H. (2024). Objective priming from pre-imagining inputs before binocular rivalry presentations does not predict individual differences in the subjective intensity of imagined experiences. Cognition, 256(106048), 106048. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2024.106048
Researchers investigated whether binocular rivalry (BR) - where different images are shown to each eye - could provide an objective way to measure individual differences in mental imagery strength. Previous studies suggested that imagining an image before viewing competing images might influence what people see, but it wasn't clear if this effect reliably indicated how vividly someone could visualize. The study tested 77 participants using three methods: a standard questionnaire (VVIQ2) asking people to rate their visualization abilities, having people imagine specific patterns before showing different images to each eye, and testing how accurately people could spot small changes in images after imagining them. While imagining an image beforehand did influence what people reported seeing overall, this effect wasn't stronger in people who reported more vivid mental imagery. The ability to detect small changes in images after imagining them wasn't clearly linked to self-reported visualization strength. People's ratings of their visualization abilities were more consistent than the other measurements. The researchers conclude that while mental imagery can influence what we see, current binocular rivalry tests don't reliably measure individual differences in visualization ability. This highlights the ongoing challenge of developing objective ways to measure aphantasia and imagery strength. More research is needed to develop better measurement tools that could help tailor visualization-based therapies and techniques to different people's abilities.
Research
Content determination in dreams supports the imagination theory
Gregory, D. (2024). Content determination in dreams supports the imagination theory. Philosophical Studies. doi:10.1007/s11098-024-02250-3
A 2024 paper by Gregory explores fundamental theories about how dreams work, though it wasn't directly studying aphantasia or hyperphantasia. The research examines two competing theories about dreaming that may have implications for understanding these conditions. The "orthodox" theory suggests dreams involve hallucinations (false perceptual experiences) combined with actual beliefs. The alternative "imagination" theory proposes dreams involve sensory imagining and propositional imagining (the ability to imagine that something is true without any sensory representation, like understanding a fictional fact). Gregory provides two features of dreams that support the imagination theory. First, in dreams we often "know" things that aren't shown through sensory experience - like knowing you're a doctor without seeing or experiencing anything that indicates this. This suggests propositional imagining rather than actual beliefs. Second, dreams can skip through time in ways real experiences cannot. A dream might include climbing three mountains in different countries, showing only key moments while skipping the travel between. This temporal segmentation supports sensory imagining rather than hallucination, since actual perception (whether true or false) must be continuous. While this paper wasn't designed to study aphantasia or hyperphantasia, its theoretical examination of how dreams work could inform future research into these conditions. Gregory notes they aren't claiming dreams never involve hallucinations or beliefs, but rather that certain features of dreams are better explained by the imagination theory.
Research
The impact of aphantasia on mental healthcare experiences: Stage 2 Registered Report
Reeder, R. R., Mawtus, B., Thomas, B. R., & Renwick, F. (2024). The impact of aphantasia on mental healthcare experiences: Stage 2 Registered Report. doi:10.31234/osf.io/f6h5q
Around 4% of people have a condition called aphantasia, where they lack the ability to visualize mental images. This study looked at how aphantasia impacts the diagnosis and treatment of mental health conditions. Many mental illnesses involve symptoms related to mental imagery, like flashbacks in PTSD or negative body image in eating disorders. And common therapies like cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) rely heavily on visualizing images in your mind. The researchers surveyed people with aphantasia and typical imagery abilities about their experiences with mental health care. The data showed mental health conditions manifest very differently in aphantasia, with a lack of imagery-related symptoms. People with aphantasia frequently reported a lack of awareness about their condition led to missed or incorrect diagnoses by providers. Importantly, those with aphantasia said therapy techniques involving visualizing images, especially in CBT, were ineffective for treating their mental illness compared to typical controls. In-depth interviews revealed two main themes for those with aphantasia - a quest to understand their lack of imagery and different journeys through mental health care. Some found their aphantasia through seeking help, describing memory challenges and feeling different. Their mental health care experiences varied - those with anxiety, depression or neurodivergence had more success, while those with trauma or complex conditions heavily relied on providers' empathy and understanding for positive outcomes. Overall, the findings highlight the widespread impact aphantasia can have on all aspects of mental health care - from recognizing and diagnosing conditions to treatment through therapy. Increased awareness is needed for aphantasia in mental health settings.
Research
Decoding sound content in the early visual cortex of aphantasic participants
Montabes de la Cruz, B. M., Abbatecola, C., Luciani, R. S., Paton, A. T., Bergmann, J., Vetter, P., … Muckli, L. F. (2024). Decoding sound content in the early visual cortex of aphantasic participants. Current Biology: CB, 34(21), 5083-5089.e3. doi:10.1016/j.cub.2024.09.008
A 2024 study by Montabes de la Cruz and colleagues investigated how the early visual cortex (EVC) processes sound information in people with aphantasia compared to sighted and blind individuals. The researchers used fMRI to measure brain activity while 23 blindfolded aphantasic participants listened to different auditory scenes (forest, crowd, and traffic). The study found that aphantasic participants showed reduced sound decoding in early visual areas compared to both blindfolded sighted (control) and blind participants. While some sound decoding was possible in specific regions (peripheral V1 and foveal V3), it was generally attenuated across the visual cortex in aphantasic individuals. This finding suggests that aphantasia may be associated with decreased feedback connectivity specific to the early visual cortex, affecting not just visual imagery but also how auditory information is processed in visual areas. The researchers found a hierarchy of feedback connectivity strength: blind participants showed the strongest connectivity, followed by sighted controls, with aphantasic individuals showing the weakest. These results contribute to our understanding of aphantasia's neural basis, suggesting it may involve broader changes in how the visual cortex processes multi-sensory information, rather than just affecting visual imagery alone.
Research
An international estimate of the prevalence of differing visual imagery abilities
Wright, D. J., Scott, M. W., Kraeutner, S. N., Barhoun, P., Bertollo, M., Campbell, M. J., … Holmes, P. S. (2024). An international estimate of the prevalence of differing visual imagery abilities. Frontiers in Psychology, 15, 1454107. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1454107
A 2024 international study by Wright and colleagues provided the most comprehensive prevalence estimates of visual imagery abilities to date. Across two studies with a combined sample of 9,063 participants, the researchers found that about 4.2% of people have difficulty generating visual imagery: 0.9% experience aphantasia (complete inability to generate voluntary mental images) and 3.3% experience hypophantasia (only vague and dim imagery). The majority of people (89.7%) have typical imagery ability, while 6.1% experience hyperphantasia (extremely vivid imagery "as clear as normal vision"). These findings were consistent across different countries and cultures, and weren't significantly affected by gender or education level. The study improved upon previous research by using an adequately sized sample, avoiding recruitment bias by not mentioning imagery in study advertisements, and employing consistent criteria for categorizing imagery abilities. The researchers used the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) to assess imagery ability, with specific score ranges defining each category. This research provides important baseline data for understanding the distribution of imagery abilities in the general population and has implications for both research and clinical applications where imagery-based techniques are used.
Research
Aphantasia and autism: An investigation of mental imagery vividness
King, R., Buxton, H., & Tyndall, I. (2024). Aphantasia and autism: An investigation of mental imagery vividness. Consciousness and Cognition, 125(103749), 103749. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2024.103749
A 2024 study by King, Buxton, and Tyndall investigated whether autistic adults experience different levels of mental imagery vividness compared to non-autistic adults, particularly examining potential connections to aphantasia. The researchers compared 74 autistic participants (both clinically diagnosed and self-identifying) with 47 non-autistic participants using multiple imagery measures. Key findings showed that autistic participants reported significantly lower visual imagery vividness on both the VVIQ and PSI-Q scales compared to non-autistic participants. The autistic group also showed a higher prevalence of aphantasia (20.27% vs 6.38% using standard criteria; 5% vs 0% using stricter criteria). Interestingly, when examining imagery across different sensory modalities, differences were only found in visual and emotional imagery, with no significant differences in other modalities like sound, smell, taste, touch, or bodily sensations. The reduced emotional imagery finding aligns with research on alexithymia and interoception in autism. The study extends previous research by directly examining imagery vividness in autism and demonstrating that while autistic individuals may use mental imagery frequently, they might experience it less vividly, particularly for visual and emotional content.