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Do low imagers know more words? examining the association between mental imagery and vocabulary size

DOI: 10.1080/23273798.2026.2614588
Tags:
HyperphantasiaHypophantasiaLearning
Yavuz, M., & Nazir, T. A. (2026). Do low imagers know more words? examining the association between mental imagery and vocabulary size. Language, Cognition and Neuroscience, 1–14. doi:10.1080/23273798.2026.2614588

Abstract

Mental imagery is often assumed to support vocabulary learning by enriching semantic representations, yet hybrid accounts of embodied cognition leave open the possibility that limited imagery, and the resulting reliance on verbal-analytic strategies, may ultimately support larger vocabularies. We tested whether imagery vividness predicts vocabulary knowledge and whether any relation depends on word concreteness. After collecting concreteness ratings for Vocabulary Size Test (VST) items, a separate group completed the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) and VST. At the person level, VVIQ was not significantly correlated with total vocabulary score. However, item-level mixed-effects regression revealed a significant VVIQ×concretenessinteraction: higher imagery was associated with lower accuracy for highly concrete words. These findings suggest that vivid imagery does not confer an advantage in definition-matching tasks and may, for concrete words, subtly interfere with performance, consistent with compensatory verbal-analytic strategies in low-imagery individuals.

Authors

  • Melisa Yavuz2
  • Tatjana A. Nazir2

What This Study Is About

Researchers wanted to know if the way we think affects how many words we know. Specifically, they asked: Do people with aphantasia—the inability to create mental imagery (pictures in the mind)—actually have larger vocabularies because they rely more on words and descriptions than on mental "movies"?

How They Studied It

The researchers worked with 158 participants. To get a clear picture, they specifically made sure to include people with very low imagery skills.
  • The Imagery Test: Participants took a famous survey called the VVIQ, which asks you to rate how vividly you can "see" things like a sunset or a friend’s face in your mind.
  • The Word Test: They took a vocabulary test where they had to match tricky words to their correct dictionary definitions.
  • The Word Type: The team also looked at whether words were "concrete" (things you can touch, like *tweezers*) or "abstract" (ideas, like *justice*).

What They Found

While there wasn't a massive difference across the whole group, the researchers found a fascinating "trade-off" at the extremes.
  • The Vocabulary Edge: People in the bottom 15% of imagery (low imagers) actually had significantly higher vocabulary scores than those in the top 15% (high imagers).
  • The Concrete Word Curveball: Surprisingly, people with very vivid mental images were actually *less* accurate at defining concrete words. It’s as if being able to "see" a pair of tweezers in their head made it harder for them to pick the precise dictionary definition from a list.

What This Might Mean

This suggests that people with aphantasia might develop "compensatory strategies." Because they can't rely on a mental picture, they might store information using "verbal-analytic" strategies—basically, thinking in definitions and categories.
However, we have to be careful: this was a relatively small group of people, and the study was done online. It doesn't prove that aphantasia makes you a genius at Scrabble, but it does suggest that our brains find different, equally cool ways to navigate the world of language.

One Interesting Detail

The researchers found that for high imagers, a word like "octopus" might trigger such a vivid mental picture that it actually "interferes" with the brain's ability to focus on the specific, dry language needed for a definition test!
This summary was generated by AI and may contain errors. Always refer to the original paper for accuracy.