The Aphantasia Definition
The concept of aphantasia, widely recognized as the inability to visualize, has been expanded in a new publication. An article in the international journal Cortex entitled Aphantasia with contributions by Adam Zeman, Merlin Monzel, Joel Pearson, Christian Scholz, and Julia Simner, proposes a broader framework for understanding the condition. This broadened aphantasia definition represents a significant shift in our understanding of the condition and may have far-reaching implications for research, diagnosis, and how individuals identify with aphantasia.
The publication puts forward several significant revisions to our understanding of aphantasia. First, the definition now extends beyond visual imagery to encompass the absence of other sensory modalities. Additionally, it now includes both the absence and near-absence of imagery, suggesting that individuals with very weak or fleeting mental imagery might be considered on the aphantasia spectrum.
The aphantasia definition also accounts for both deliberate attempts to form mental images and spontaneous imagery formation, such as when reading a novel. Furthermore, it makes an important distinction between congenital aphantasia, present from birth but possibly identified later in life, and acquired aphantasia, which results from neurological or psychiatric injuries or disorders.
Aphantasia Definitions
The following is a summary of aphantasia definitions. In this summary, the 'Broad Terms' category covers the general definitions and overarching concepts related to aphantasia. The 'Sensory Modalities' category encompasses the specific sub-types of aphantasia based on the affected sensory domain. Finally, the 'Origin' category distinguishes between aphantasia present from birth (congenital) and aphantasia resulting from neurological or psychiatric conditions (acquired).
Broad Terms
Aphantasia refers to the absence or near-absence of imagery, most commonly the inability to visualize things that are outside our field of view while we are in the state of full wakefulness. This implies an inability to form mental images with sensory attributes (i.e., to visualize a picture in the mind's eye), as opposed to 'thinking about' the item in question.
Multisensory aphantasia describes the absence of mental imagery in two or more sensory modalities, such as visual, sound, smell, taste, movement, or touch.
Global aphantasia represents the complete absence of mental imagery across all sensory modalities. This is sometimes referred to as 'total aphantasia.'
Sensory Modalities
- Visual aphantasia manifests as the inability to form mental images or visualize in one's mind's eye.
- Auditory aphantasia prevents the mental recreation of sounds, voices, or music.
- Olfactory aphantasia involves the inability to mentally recreate or imagine smells.
- Gustatory aphantasia affects the ability to mentally recreate or imagine tastes.
- Motor aphantasia presents as the inability to mentally rehearse or imagine movements or actions.
- Tactile aphantasia involves the inability to mentally recreate or imagine sensations of touch or texture.
Origin
Aphantasia can be either acquired or congenital. Acquired aphantasia develops later in life, often due to neurological or psychological conditions, brain injuries, or trauma. Congenital aphantasia is present from birth, likely due to genetic or developmental factors.
Types of Aphantasia
Aphantasia can be classified into different types based on the sensory modalities affected (global, multisensory, or single-sensory) and the origin (congenital or acquired). The potential types range from the complete absence of imagery across all senses to the absence of imagery in specific sensory domains.
Global aphantasia manifests in two forms: congenital, where there is a complete absence of mental imagery across all senses from birth, and acquired, where this complete absence develops later in life due to neurological or psychological conditions, brain injury, or trauma.
Multisensory aphantasia similarly appears in both congenital and acquired forms, involving the absence of mental imagery in two or more senses. The congenital form is present from birth, while the acquired form develops later due to various neurological or psychological factors.
Single-sensory aphantasia can also be either congenital or acquired, affecting just one sensory modality. Examples include visual aphantasia, auditory aphantasia, or other specific sensory domains.
Implications for the Aphantasia Community
While this expanded aphantasia definition offers a more comprehensive understanding of aphantasia, it also raises important questions for our aphantasia community:
- The new definition encompasses multiple sensory modalities beyond visual imagery. How might this multisensory perspective change our understanding of aphantasia and its impact on daily life?
- While broadening the aphantasia definition to include 'near-absence' of imagery offers more inclusivity, how do we ensure the experiences of those with total aphantasia remain distinct within this broader framework? How do we balance inclusivity with the need for precise scientific and intellectual categorization?
- How might this expanded definition influence self-identification within the aphantasia community, particularly for those who experience spontaneous imagery but not deliberate?
- With the distinction between congenital and acquired aphantasia clearly defined, what new avenues of research might this open up regarding the plasticity of mental imagery and potential interventions?
These considerations touch on fundamental aspects of how we understand the condition, how individuals identify with it, and what it means for future research. Let's dive deeper into this expanded aphantasia definition and explore both the opportunities and challenges it may present.
The Case for Global Aphantasia as a Single Term
Using terms like 'visual aphantasia,' 'auditory aphantasia,' and 'global aphantasia' represents a unified approach to terminology. This framework was challenged in 2021 when researchers proposed creating entirely new terms like 'anauralia' for auditory imagery absence and 'dysikonesia' for absence across all senses. In response, a commentary published in the journal Cortex advocated for maintaining the 'aphantasia' terminology with appropriate modifiers, arguing this approach was more flexible and precise, while already being well-established in both scientific and public discourse. Consider a practical example: someone who experiences auditory imagery (i.e. they can “hear” and compose music in their minds) but lacks mental imagery in all other sensory modalities can simply describe their experience as 'aphantasia in all senses except auditory.' This description is far more accessible than using separate specialized terms for each affected sense—terms that would need to be newly created for less commonly discussed modalities like motor or tactile imagery.
This unified terminology not only streamlines communication but also creates an inclusive framework that can accommodate the full spectrum of imagery experiences. It empowers individuals to accurately describe their unique cognitive landscape without relying on an unwieldy collection of distinct terms, making it easier for both individuals and others to understand and discuss their experiences.
The Spectrum of Imagery Experiences: Where to Draw the Line for Aphantasia?
The expanded aphantasia definition now includes individuals with hypophantasia or low imagery ability, recognizing that those with weak imagery often identify with the challenges and unique strengths associated with aphantasia. Their experience mirrors or closely mirrors that of having 'almost aphantasia.' However, this inclusion raises important questions about the distinction between some imagery—even if dim, vague, or fleeting—and its complete absence. The concept of 'functional aphantasia'—where weak imagery is practically equivalent to its absence in daily life—has merit. Many individuals with hypophantasia face similar challenges and employ comparable cognitive strategies to those with complete aphantasia.
However from a scientific perspective, this distinction could be crucial. The Aphantasia Network has received numerous anecdotal accounts from individuals with weak or dim imagery who report improving their abilities through practice and dedication. Techniques such as “image streaming” have gained popularity in online forums among this group. While no published studies validate these techniques' effectiveness, it's noteworthy that there's no evidence suggesting those with congenital aphantasia can achieve similar improvements. However, some individuals with acquired aphantasia have reported regaining imagery ability. These anecdotal reports warrant further study, and distinguishing between groups in research settings will be essential to understanding what interventions might be effective and for whom. This distinction has significant implications for research. While individuals with weak imagery may be functionally aphantasic in daily life, maintaining distinctions in research settings could help us understand whether different mechanisms or intervention approaches apply to different points on the imagery spectrum. This raises questions about functional differences between those with weak versus no imagery, and how these differences might impact daily life, cognitive processes, and potential interventions.
As research into altering imagery abilities through training or intervention progresses, distinguishing between these groups becomes increasingly crucial for understanding potential risks and benefits. The evolving understanding of mental imagery may require more nuanced terminology to differentiate various levels of imagery ability. This raises the question of whether aphantasia should be viewed as a spectrum condition rather than a categorical one—a shift with implications for both scientific understanding and personal identification.
This expanded aphantasia definition challenges us to critically examine where we draw the line for aphantasia and how this decision impacts research, clinical practice, and individual experiences. It requires balancing scientific precision with the lived experiences of those who identify with the aphantasia community. While functional aphantasia is a valuable concept for daily life and community identification, maintaining finer distinctions in research contexts may be important for understanding mechanisms, prevalence, and potential interventions. Deliberate vs Spontaneous: The Importance of Distinguishing Between Different Types of Imagery Experiences
The aphantasia definition acknowledges a crucial distinction: it can affect both deliberate attempts to form mental images (such as when instructed to visualize an apple) and spontaneous imagery formation (like automatically visualizing a scene while reading a novel). This recognition opens up intriguing questions about the nature of mental imagery and how we classify different imagery experiences. This distinction becomes particularly relevant when considering individuals who experience spontaneous imagery but struggle with deliberate visualization. Such cases challenge our current understanding of aphantasia and raise important questions about the mechanisms underlying different types of imagery experiences. Should these experiences be classified as a form of aphantasia, or do they represent a distinct phenomenon?
A fascinating aspect of aphantasia emerges when considering involuntary imagery, such as dreams or hypnagogic and hypnopompic states. While aphantasia typically affects voluntary imagery formation, some individuals with global aphantasia report vivid dreams despite a complete lack of imagery in their waking life. This preservation of dream imagery suggests different neural pathways might be involved in dream generation compared to conscious, wakeful imagery. These observations raise fundamental questions about the nature of mental imagery. How do the mechanisms of spontaneous and deliberate imagery differ? What insights can the preservation of dream imagery in some aphantasics offer about the nature of mental imagery and consciousness? How might these distinctions shape future research and potential interventions for aphantasia?
As research continues, we may need to develop more nuanced ways of describing and categorizing imagery experiences. This deeper understanding could not only enhance our comprehension of aphantasia but also reveal new insights into the workings of the human mind.
The Two Faces of Aphantasia: Congenital and Acquired
The aphantasia definition distinguishes between two origins: congenital and acquired. This distinction is crucial for understanding the condition's diverse manifestations and potential interventions.
Congenital Aphantasia: Born Without the Mind's Eye, Mind's Ear, etc.
Congenital aphantasia is present from birth, though often recognized later in life. Individuals with this form have never experienced mental imagery in one or more of the senses, leading them to develop unique cognitive strategies throughout their development. The causes may be genetic or related to early development, offering insights into how the brain functions without imagery from the start.
Acquired Aphantasia: When the Mind's Eye, Mind's Ear, etc. Closes
Acquired aphantasia occurs when someone loses their ability to generate mental imagery in one or more sense due to neurological injuries, psychiatric disorders, or other medical conditions. This sudden loss of a previously available cognitive function provides a unique perspective on the brain's adaptability and the role of mental imagery in cognition.
These distinct manifestations raise intriguing questions about brain plasticity and adaptation. How does the brain compensate for a lifelong absence of imagery versus its sudden loss? Can studying acquired aphantasia inform potential treatments? What do the differences between these two forms reveal about the neural basis of mental imagery?
By recognizing both types, researchers can better tailor their studies and potential interventions, while individuals with aphantasia can gain valuable context for their experiences. As research progresses, this distinction will likely play a crucial role in shaping our understanding of aphantasia and its implications for cognitive science.
Moving Forward with an Expanded Understanding
The aphantasia definition proposed by Zeman and colleagues marks a significant shift in our understanding of this fascinating condition. We've explored several key aspects of this expanded definition:
The case for using a single term, 'aphantasia', across all sensory modalities offers a unified framework for discussion and research. The inclusion of 'near absence' of imagery challenges us to consider where we draw definitional boundaries. The distinction between deliberate and spontaneous imagery experiences provides new insights into the complexity of mental imagery. Finally, the recognition of both congenital and acquired forms helps us better understand the condition's diverse manifestations.
These changes offer a more comprehensive framework for understanding aphantasia, but they also raise important questions about how we categorize, study, and support individuals with varying degrees of imagery ability. As we move forward, it's crucial that the aphantasia community plays an active role in shaping this evolving understanding. Aphantasia Community Perspectives
Your experiences, insights, and perspectives are invaluable in guiding future research and refining aphantasia definitions. We invite you to contribute to this ongoing dialogue by completing our community survey below. By participating, you'll help ensure that our collective understanding of aphantasia remains grounded in the lived experiences of those it affects most directly.
Together, we can work towards a more nuanced, accurate, and helpful conceptualization of aphantasia that serves both the scientific community and individuals living with this unique cognitive trait.
If you wish to share additional perspectives beyond the survey questions, please use the comments section below.
