Involuntary Imagery
Involuntary imagery shows up unbidden: in dreams, flashbacks, or a sudden memory. Some with aphantasia experience this despite lacking voluntary imagery.
Involuntary imagery shows up unbidden: in dreams, flashbacks, or a sudden memory. Some with aphantasia experience this despite lacking voluntary imagery.
Involuntary imagery shows up unbidden: in dreams, flashbacks, or a sudden memory. Some with aphantasia experience this despite lacking voluntary imagery.
Pupillometry showed that imagined brightness modulates pupil size, but these changes did not correlate with individual self-reported imagery vividness. This suggests a dissociation between subjective reports and objective physiological measures of imagery.
Vanbuckhave, C., Huson, N., Lœvenbruck, H., Guyader, N., & Chauvin, A. (2026). Pupil changes to voluntary and involuntary visual imagery: a unified paradigm with implications for aphantasia research. Neuropsychologia, 223, 109378. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2026.109378
Vivid mental imagery is linked to an inwardly focused cognitive style involving interoceptive awareness and mindful presence. This suggests that imagery ability influences mental health by mediating emotional processing and memory.
Kvamme, T. L., Rutiku, R., Wierzchoń, M., Griskova-Bulanova, I., Fardo, F., Barzykowski, K., Sandberg, K., & Silvanto, J. (2026). An inwardly focused cognitive style links mental imagery and mental health. Heliyon, 12(2), e44433. doi:10.1016/j.heliyon.2025.e44433
Involuntary mental imagery is more frequent and vivid than hallucinations, though both share similar phenomenological traits. This suggests these inner experiences exist on a continuum rather than being entirely distinct phenomena.
Pepin, G., Lœvenbruck, H., Chauvin, A., Jacquet, C., Eichenlaub, J.-B., & Bortolon, C. (2026). Comparing the characteristics of hallucinations and mental imagery: a large cross-sectional study in the general population. Consciousness and Cognition, 137, 103974. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2025.103974
Aphantasia is a heterogeneous condition with distinct subtypes, including variations in voluntary control and sensory modalities. Recognizing these differences is essential for developing accurate experimental methodologies and explanations.
Nanay, B. (2025). Varieties of aphantasia. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 29(11), 965–966. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2025.06.008
A decade of research shows aphantasia is a heterogeneous condition with varying subtypes and preserved cognitive performance. This suggests that conscious visual imagery is not required for complex tasks like memory and spatial reasoning.
Zeman, A. (2025). A decade of aphantasia research – and still going!. Neuropsychologia, 219, 109278. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2025.109278
Aphantasia is not a monolithic condition, as many individuals retain involuntary imagery like dreams despite lacking voluntary control. This suggests that mental imagery relies on multiple distinct processes that can break down independently.
Nanay, B. (2025). Mental imagery, predictive processing, aphantasia, and the interaction between philosophy and cognitive science: responses to <scp>amy kind</scp>, <scp>christian scholz</scp>, and <scp>neil van leeuwen</scp>. Mind & Language, 40(3), 333–340. doi:10.1111/mila.12561
Researchers found that individuals with weak or absent visual imagery are more resistant to involuntary mental visualizations. This suggests that aphantasia may provide a natural defense against intrusive thoughts and sensory-based distractions.
Arnold, D. H., Hutchinson, M., Bouyer, L. N., Schwarzkopf, D. S., Pellicano, E., & Saurels, B. W. (2025). Don't think of a pink elephant: individual differences in visualisation predict involuntary imagery and its neural correlates. Cortex, 183, 53–65. doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2024.10.020
Aphantasics reported significantly less intense afterimages and fewer, less vivid dreams than controls. This suggests aphantasia is a general deficit in forming mental imagery, whether voluntary or involuntary, rather than a purely volitional one.
Krempel, R., & Monzel, M. (2024). Aphantasia and involuntary imagery. Consciousness and Cognition, 120, 103679. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2024.103679
Aphantasics report visual dreams despite lacking voluntary mental imagery, challenging the idea that dreaming is a form of imagination. This suggests that dreaming and voluntary imagery may rely on distinct cognitive and neural mechanisms.
Whiteley, C. M. K. (2021). Aphantasia, imagination and dreaming. Philosophical Studies, 178(6), 2111–2132. doi:https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-020-01526-8
Researchers propose a dichotomous framework for phantom perception, distinguishing between voluntary mental imagery and involuntary experiences like illusions or synesthesia. This classification helps unify diverse sensory phenomena and provides a roadmap for studying the neural mechanisms of constructive perception.
Pearson, J., & Westbrook, F. (2015). Phantom perception: voluntary and involuntary nonretinal vision. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 19(5), 278–284. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2015.03.004
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