Expanding Aphantasia Definition: Researchers Propose New Boundaries

Researchers expand aphantasia definition beyond "inability to visualize." This broader framework impacts how we understand and identify with the condition.
aphantasia definition, aphantasia definitions
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Table of Contents

The Aphantasia Definition

The concept of aphantasia, widely recognized as the inability to visualize, has been expanded in a new publication. An article in the international journal Cortex entitled Aphantasia with contributions by Adam Zeman, Merlin Monzel, Joel Pearson, Christian Scholz, and Julia Simner, proposes a broader framework for understanding the condition. 

This broadened aphantasia definition represents a significant shift in our understanding of the condition and may have far-reaching implications for research, diagnosis, and how individuals identify with aphantasia.

The publication puts forward several significant revisions to our understanding of aphantasia. First, the definition now extends beyond visual imagery to encompass the absence of other sensory modalities. Additionally, it now includes both the absence and near-absence of imagery, suggesting that individuals with very weak or fleeting mental imagery might be considered on the aphantasia spectrum. 

The aphantasia definition also accounts for both deliberate attempts to form mental images and spontaneous imagery formation, such as when reading a novel. Furthermore, it makes an important distinction between congenital aphantasia, present from birth but possibly identified later in life, and acquired aphantasia, which results from neurological or psychiatric injuries or disorders.

Aphantasia Definitions

The following is a summary of aphantasia definitions. In this summary, the ‘Broad Terms’ category covers the general definitions and overarching concepts related to aphantasia. The ‘Sensory Modalities’ category encompasses the specific sub-types of aphantasia based on the affected sensory domain. Finally, the ‘Origin’ category distinguishes between aphantasia present from birth (congenital) and aphantasia resulting from neurological or psychiatric conditions (acquired).

Broad Terms

Aphantasia refers to the absence or near-absence of imagery, most commonly the inability to visualize things that are outside our field of view while we are in the state of full wakefulness. This implies an inability to form mental images with sensory attributes (i.e., to visualize a picture in the mind’s eye), as opposed to ‘thinking about’ the item in question.

Multisensory aphantasia describes the absence of mental imagery in two or more sensory modalities, such as visual, sound, smell, taste, movement, or touch. 

Global aphantasia represents the complete absence of mental imagery across all sensory modalities. This is sometimes referred to as ‘total aphantasia.’

Sensory Modalities

  • Visual aphantasia manifests as the inability to form mental images or visualize in one’s mind’s eye. 
  • Auditory aphantasia prevents the mental recreation of sounds, voices, or music. 
  • Olfactory aphantasia involves the inability to mentally recreate or imagine smells. 
  • Gustatory aphantasia affects the ability to mentally recreate or imagine tastes. 
  • Motor aphantasia presents as the inability to mentally rehearse or imagine movements or actions. 
  • Tactile aphantasia involves the inability to mentally recreate or imagine sensations of touch or texture.

Origin

Aphantasia can be either acquired or congenital. Acquired aphantasia develops later in life, often due to neurological or psychological conditions, brain injuries, or trauma. Congenital aphantasia is present from birth, likely due to genetic or developmental factors.

Types of Aphantasia

Aphantasia can be classified into different types based on the sensory modalities affected (global, multisensory, or single-sensory) and the origin (congenital or acquired). The potential types range from the complete absence of imagery across all senses to the absence of imagery in specific sensory domains.

Global aphantasia manifests in two forms: congenital, where there is a complete absence of mental imagery across all senses from birth, and acquired, where this complete absence develops later in life due to neurological or psychological conditions, brain injury, or trauma.

Multisensory aphantasia similarly appears in both congenital and acquired forms, involving the absence of mental imagery in two or more senses. The congenital form is present from birth, while the acquired form develops later due to various neurological or psychological factors.

Single-sensory aphantasia can also be either congenital or acquired, affecting just one sensory modality. Examples include visual aphantasia, auditory aphantasia, or other specific sensory domains.

Implications for the Aphantasia Community

While this expanded aphantasia definition offers a more comprehensive understanding of aphantasia, it also raises important questions for our aphantasia community:

  1. The new definition encompasses multiple sensory modalities beyond visual imagery. How might this multisensory perspective change our understanding of aphantasia and its impact on daily life?
  2. While broadening the aphantasia definition to include ‘near-absence’ of imagery offers more inclusivity, does it risk diluting the experiences of those with total aphantasia? How do we balance inclusivity with the need for precise scientific and intellectual categorization?
  3. How might this expanded definition influence self-identification within the aphantasia community, particularly for those who experience spontaneous imagery but not deliberate?
  4. With the distinction between congenital and acquired aphantasia clearly defined, what new avenues of research might this open up regarding the plasticity of mental imagery and potential interventions?

These considerations touch on fundamental aspects of how we understand the condition, how individuals identify with it, and what it means for future research. Let’s dive deeper into this expanded aphantasia definition and explore both the opportunities and challenges it may present. 

The Case for Global Aphantasia as a Single Term

Using terms like ‘visual aphantasia,’ ‘auditory aphantasia,’ and ‘global aphantasia’ represents a unified approach to terminology. This framework was challenged in 2021 when researchers proposed creating entirely new terms like ‘anauralia’ for auditory imagery absence and ‘dysikonesia’ for absence across all senses. In response, a commentary published in the journal Cortex advocated for maintaining the ‘aphantasia’ terminology with appropriate modifiers, arguing this approach was more flexible and precise, while already being well-established in both scientific and public discourse.

Consider a practical example: someone who experiences auditory imagery (i.e. they can “hear” and compose music in their minds) but lacks mental imagery in all other sensory modalities can simply describe their experience as ‘aphantasia in all senses except auditory.’ This description is far more accessible than using separate specialized terms for each affected sense—terms that would need to be newly created for less commonly discussed modalities like motor or tactile imagery.

This unified terminology not only streamlines communication but also creates an inclusive framework that can accommodate the full spectrum of imagery experiences. It empowers individuals to accurately describe their unique cognitive landscape without relying on an unwieldy collection of distinct terms, making it easier for both individuals and others to understand and discuss their experiences.

The Spectrum of Imagery Experiences: Where to Draw the Line for Aphantasia?

The expanded aphantasia definition now includes individuals with hypophantasia or low imagery ability, recognizing that those with weak imagery often identify with the challenges and unique strengths associated with aphantasia. Their experience mirrors or closely mirrors that of having ‘almost aphantasia.’ However, this inclusion raises important questions about the distinction between some imagery—even if dim, vague, or fleeting—and its complete absence.

From a scientific perspective, this distinction could be crucial. The Aphantasia Network has received numerous anecdotal accounts from individuals with weak or dim imagery who report improving their abilities through practice and dedication. Techniques such as “image streaming” have gained popularity in online forums among this group. While no published studies validate these techniques’ effectiveness, it’s noteworthy that there’s no evidence suggesting those with congenital aphantasia can achieve similar improvements. However, some individuals with acquired aphantasia have reported regaining imagery ability. These varying experiences underscore the importance of distinguishing between these groups (those with weak imagery, congenital aphantasia, and acquired aphantasia) in research and discussions.

This distinction has significant implications for research. Including weak imagers in aphantasia studies might affect outcomes and potentially obscure findings specific to those with a complete absence of imagery. This raises questions about functional differences between those with weak versus no imagery, and how these differences might impact daily life, cognitive processes, and potential interventions.

As research into altering imagery abilities through training or intervention progresses, distinguishing between these groups becomes increasingly crucial for understanding potential risks and benefits. The evolving understanding of mental imagery may require more nuanced terminology to differentiate various levels of imagery ability. This raises the question of whether aphantasia should be viewed as a spectrum condition rather than a categorical one—a shift with implications for both scientific understanding and personal identification.

This expanded aphantasia definition challenges us to critically examine where we draw the line for aphantasia and how this decision impacts research, clinical practice, and individual experiences. It requires balancing scientific precision with the lived experiences of those who identify with the aphantasia community, while considering the risks of misdiagnosis, over-identification, and prevalence overestimation that could result from a broader definition.

Deliberate vs Spontaneous: The Importance of Distinguishing Between Different Types of Imagery Experiences

The aphantasia definition acknowledges a crucial distinction: it can affect both deliberate attempts to form mental images (such as when instructed to visualize an apple) and spontaneous imagery formation (like automatically visualizing a scene while reading a novel). This recognition opens up intriguing questions about the nature of mental imagery and how we classify different imagery experiences.

This distinction becomes particularly relevant when considering individuals who experience spontaneous imagery but struggle with deliberate visualization. Such cases challenge our current understanding of aphantasia and raise important questions about the mechanisms underlying different types of imagery experiences. Should these experiences be classified as a form of aphantasia, or do they represent a distinct phenomenon?

A fascinating aspect of aphantasia emerges when considering involuntary imagery, such as dreams or hypnagogic and hypnopompic states. While aphantasia typically affects voluntary imagery formation, some individuals with global aphantasia report vivid dreams despite a complete lack of imagery in their waking life. This preservation of dream imagery suggests different neural pathways might be involved in dream generation compared to conscious, wakeful imagery.

These observations raise fundamental questions about the nature of mental imagery. How do the mechanisms of spontaneous and deliberate imagery differ? What insights can the preservation of dream imagery in some aphantasics offer about the nature of mental imagery and consciousness? How might these distinctions shape future research and potential interventions for aphantasia?

As research continues, we may need to develop more nuanced ways of describing and categorizing imagery experiences. This deeper understanding could not only enhance our comprehension of aphantasia but also reveal new insights into the workings of the human mind.

The Two Faces of Aphantasia: Congenital and Acquired

The aphantasia definition distinguishes between two origins: congenital and acquired. This distinction is crucial for understanding the condition’s diverse manifestations and potential interventions.

Congenital Aphantasia: Born Without the Mind’s Eye, Mind’s Ear, etc.

Congenital aphantasia is present from birth, though often recognized later in life. Individuals with this form have never experienced mental imagery in one or more of the senses, leading them to develop unique cognitive strategies throughout their development. The causes may be genetic or related to early development, offering insights into how the brain functions without imagery from the start.

Acquired Aphantasia: When the Mind’s Eye, Mind’s Ear, etc. Closes

Acquired aphantasia occurs when someone loses their ability to generate mental imagery in one or more sense due to neurological injuries, psychiatric disorders, or other medical conditions. This sudden loss of a previously available cognitive function provides a unique perspective on the brain’s adaptability and the role of mental imagery in cognition.

These distinct manifestations raise intriguing questions about brain plasticity and adaptation. How does the brain compensate for a lifelong absence of imagery versus its sudden loss? Can studying acquired aphantasia inform potential treatments? What do the differences between these two forms reveal about the neural basis of mental imagery?

By recognizing both types, researchers can better tailor their studies and potential interventions, while individuals with aphantasia can gain valuable context for their experiences. As research progresses, this distinction will likely play a crucial role in shaping our understanding of aphantasia and its implications for cognitive science.

Moving Forward with an Expanded Understanding

The aphantasia definition proposed by Zeman and colleagues marks a significant shift in our understanding of this fascinating condition. We’ve explored several key aspects of this expanded definition:

The case for using a single term, ‘aphantasia’, across all sensory modalities offers a unified framework for discussion and research. The inclusion of ‘near absence’ of imagery challenges us to consider where we draw definitional boundaries. The distinction between deliberate and spontaneous imagery experiences provides new insights into the complexity of mental imagery. Finally, the recognition of both congenital and acquired forms helps us better understand the condition’s diverse manifestations.

These changes offer a more comprehensive framework for understanding aphantasia, but they also raise important questions about how we categorize, study, and support individuals with varying degrees of imagery ability. As we move forward, it’s crucial that the aphantasia community plays an active role in shaping this evolving understanding.

Aphantasia Community Perspectives

Your experiences, insights, and perspectives are invaluable in guiding future research and refining aphantasia definitions. We invite you to contribute to this ongoing dialogue by completing our community survey below. By participating, you’ll help ensure that our collective understanding of aphantasia remains grounded in the lived experiences of those it affects most directly.

Together, we can work towards a more nuanced, accurate, and helpful conceptualization of aphantasia that serves both the scientific community and individuals living with this unique cognitive trait.

If you wish to share additional perspectives beyond the survey questions, please use the comments section below.

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“This preservation of dream imagery suggests different neural pathways might be involved in dream generation compared to conscious, wakeful imagery.”

I thought this have been known for a long time…

In the book “On the origin of the human mind” (Third Edition) by Andrey Vyshedskiy, he says the following:

“1.1 Imagination during dreaming and waking

A vivid and bizarre dream conjures up a myriad of novel mental images. The same exact images can be created volitionally when awake. The neurological mechanisms of these two processes are different. Voluntary combination of mental objects is mediated by the lateral prefrontal cortex (the part of the frontal cortex located just behind one’s forehead) and patients
with damage to the lateral prefrontal cortex often lose this ability. Conversely, the combination of mental objects into novel images during dreaming does not depend on the lateral prefrontal cortex: the lateral prefrontal cortex is inactive during sleep and patients whose lateral prefrontal cortex is damaged do not notice a change in their dreams.”

“Congenital aphantasia is present from birth, though often recognized later in life. Individuals with this form have never experienced mental imagery in one or more of the senses, leading them to develop unique cognitive strategies throughout their development.”

This statement comes up all the time, but the statistics that I have come up with reading about peoples experiences, show that it is more like 50/50. Half of all with Aphantasia have something that they believe is a problem, thanks to their condition. These people, me included have not automatically created an alternative strategy to doing things. There is also a smaller group within people with Aphantasia that don’t have SDAM, but that cannot memorize any facts or figures at will. We have no way of deciding what will get transferred to long term memory. No matter of repetition (spaces or otherwise) helps, and most memory techniques (like building a memory palace) is based around visualization (seeing in your mind). Look for information around how memory champions are able to do their thing, and they all use visualization.

I have asked many people with Aphantasia, that are the lucky ones, that seemingly don’t have these problems. But none are able to explain how they developed these unique cognitive strategies, that every scientist is claiming that everyone with Aphantasia have (which, like I say, isn’t true at all).

How does SDAM (severely defective autobiographical memory) fit into theses topics? The way I perceive my life as living in the eternal now – I do not remember much in my past and thus can not extrapolate into the future.

“How do we balance inclusivity with the need for precise scientific and intellectual categorization?”

I question the need for excessively precise categorization outside of actual scientific studies.

Mental imagery (or lack thereof) is a biological phenomenon, and biological phenomena because of their complexity are notoriously variable. There are concepts that are very useful and largely true, but if applied too rigorously become untrue and a hinderance.

For example, a common definition of biological species: a group of organisms that can interbreed with one another and produce fertile offspring. This is clearly incomplete, since there are “species” that reproduce asexually, such as dandelions. And that says nothing of the complexities of bacterial life and genetic exchange that is not part of sexual reproduction, extending even into the eucaryotic world. I could go on and on, but what is the point? Species is a very useful concept, with caveats.

Another biological “concept” that was big when I was young was the “central dogma” of molecular biology: genetic information flows from DNA to RNA to protein. This is what I was taught. But of course, there rapidly needed to be accommodation of the varying lifestyles of RNA viruses. Sometimes its that information flows from RNA to DNA through reverse transcription, followed by the usual sequence. Sometimes its all RNA to protein. In the many years since, the ever increasing understanding of epigenetic modifications of DNA plus the complexity of the many roles of RNA in the cell have blurred the centrality of the “central dogma.” It’s still basically true, again with some caveats. I’m not sure any biologist feels a need for that “central dogma” any more. Holding onto it too tightly would just inhibit research.

You are advocating for using aphantasia as an umbrella term to cover potentially 6 different sensory modalities. There is no implication that people without mental imagery when awake but who dream visually are outside of the definition of aphantasia (nor am I advocating that they should be). So there already is quite a lot of variation to be included.

I think that mental imagery, like many complex biological phenomena, exists along a wide spectrum. Mental imagery ranges from no quasi-sensory projection at all (the extreme of aphantasia) to projection of quasi-sensory images that may obscure part of the actual visual field (an extreme of visual hyperphantasia). It’s useful to divide up the spectrum to work on understanding the underlying processes. We are entering a time when there is less need for reliance on subjective descriptions of internal experiences since scientists can start using more objective measurements to tease out at least some of the underlying physiology. Especially for scientific experimentation, it’s important for researchers to explain how they determined their subject populations, as well as all of the details of the stimuli used and how measurements were taken and analyzed. That puts their findings in context and allows comparison to other experiments.

But I think there still is an important role for personal, subjective descriptions of experiences of mental imagery. So, in the ongoing studies on visual aphantasia, it might be helpful if researchers started to collect additional self-reported information on their subjects’ experiences with dreaming and other sensory modalities. This probably won’t contribute much of anything at all to their conclusions about the target of their investigation. But since aphantasia is relatively uncommon, it would be helpful to have more information about those who meet the criteria for specific rigorous studies, if only to understand more about the broader variation within that group.